JPRS 76749

3 October 1980

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1823

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YOUTH CHIDED FOR UNDERESTIMATING IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF WEAPONS

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 9 Sep 80 p 3

[Article: "The Love of Weapons Is Expressed by Knowing, Using, Protecting and Caring for Them"]

[Excerpts] In the hands of our people, arms have played an important role because with them, the people have fought against every occupier and our freedom, customs and wonderful traditions have been defended. In the youth organizations, good work has been done to increase concern and love for weapons and combat techniques, and for taking care of weapons properly. In their work, these youth organizations have concentrated on two main things: first, the knowledge of the traditions of our ancestors, mainly those of the Anti-fascist National Liberation War, traditions which the party has raised to a higher level, giving them a new content. To achieve this aim, a number of activities have been organized, such as meetings with veterans, visits to historic places, etc. The organization of sessions on topics such as "The Albanian and the Gun" and "The Gun and Freedom" have been very productive.

The second aspect deals with the concrete activity of the youth in learning about, using, and taking care of weapons. In this area, concepts of self-satisfaction, expressed in an underestimation of the importance of the knowledge and maintenance of weapons, are combatted. In this activity, we rely on the teachings of the party and on the requirements of the People's Military Art, which explain the place of weapons in relation to other key elements of combat. Extensive work has been done to implement the teaching of Comrade Enver Hoxha that although the decisive factor in a battle is the individual, this does not mean that arms should be underestimated. By regarding arms and techniques as important tools in the hands of the individual, we must evaluate them properly and calculate their effect on the enemy.

The youth organizations, in cooperation with the commands, in addition to their educational work in this area, have concentrated their attention in the area of increasing the demands for a daily accounting by each youth so that the directives and requirements in regard to the knowledge, protection and maintenance of weapons and combat techniques will be strictly executed. The love of each person for weapons and techniques is measured by concrete results; education by means of traditions takes concrete form and serves concretely the raising of the coefficient of preparedness.

CSO: 2100

FRG CONCEPT OF GERMAN CULTURAL UNITY REJECTED

West German Commentary

Bonn IWE-TAGESDIENST in German No 77, 22 May 80 'iwe-kultur' supplement

[Report from Berlin: "SED Insists on 'Socialist National Culture.'" A translation of the East Berlin DEUTSCHE LEHRERZEITUNG article cited below follows this commentary]

[Text] According to the SED, the GDR's art and culture have nothing in common with any of the developments in art and culture in the FRG. Hans Koch, the well-known East Berlin cultural ideologist of the SED Academy of Social Sciences stated that the "talk" of the "unity of German national culture" would hardly merit any attention, if it were not a cultural-historical and cultural-critical veneer and justification of a "policy fundamentally opposed to detente" and if it did not represent an attempt at "interference in the internal affairs of the sovereign GDR."

According to Koch, it is one of the key axioms of "the adversary's argumentation" that the GDR must not be recognized, at least not as an independent intellectual-cultural reality, and that anything uniquely characteristic of the GDR should be denied and eradicated. However, the existence of the "socialist German national culture of the GDR represents an incontestable reality." According to Koch, all objective analyses have shown that neither in its social traits and substantive characteristics nor in its cultural-historical position, its inner structures, functions and national life is there any "unity, common ground or even the slightest tendency toward agreement with the dominant imperialist culture of the FRG, in which great power-chauvinism and revanchist and hegemonic characteristics are becoming more and more apparent." Koch stated that the culture of the GDR had long been historically confirmed as "German culture of real socialism." (DEUTSCHE LEHRERZEITUNG 21/80).

GDR Academician's Discussion

East Berlin DEUTSCHE LEHRERZEITUNG in German Vol 27 No 21, 23 May 80 signed to press 15 May 80 'DLZ-Konsultation' feature supplement pp 1-8

[Contribution to Party School Year for June 1980 by Prof Dr Hans Koch, Academy of Social Sciences, SED Central Committee: "On the Continued Development of the Socialist National Culture in the GDR." Passages in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] "As is indicated by the resolutions of the Ninth Party Congress and by the program of our Party, the development of science, education and culture is an integral part of the entire policy of the Party, which is oriented toward the well-being of the people. We want to insure all-round support and encouragement of the striving for a high level of education, for fruitful scientific insight contributing to the consolidation of our socialist society and for a rich and complex cultural life. This is in accord with the nature of socialism, for socialism serves to promote the well-being of the people and the full development of the people's creative faculties. Socialism represents a society of true humanity and realized human rights, of the all-round development of socialist personalities and their cultured way of life. Thus material and cultural elements form an integral whole. We are concerned with cultural development in all sectors of our society, in all spheres of human activity."[1]

Considering what would be necessary "to establish the consummate socialist society,"[2] Lenin in 1923 stated that this would be "impossible without an all-out cultural revolution: This cultural revolution will be sufficient fully to establish socialism in our country...."[3] The implementation of the socialist cultural revolution has long been recognized and confirmed as a /universal law/ of the development of the new society.

The prediction that in the cultural sector protracted, patient and persistent work will be required has likewise been confirmed. In regard to many aspects of the development of the new society and of the socialist personality and consciousness, "only that can be regarded as firmly established which has become part of everyday life and habitual practice."[4]

Today we know from the experience gained in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, including the GDR, that the radical historic changes through which the developed socialist society matures include the further development of the socialist cultural revolution.

Of primary importance are two tasks that are closely related:

Firstly, the Party demands that the GDR's socialist national culture be extensively developed, that its patriotic and internationalist socialist substance be more and more clearly defined, that its creative achievements and new values be expanded in many directions and that the progressive and

humanistic heritage of German history and the great accomplishments of world culture (especially those of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries) be preserved in our culture.

Secondly, indicative of the importance of cultural tasks is the demand "to create the conditions necessary for the full development of the people's social relations and physical and intellectual faculties and for insuring that they can lead a rich and cultured life, that the working people's thought and action are determined by the socialist ideology, by the Marxist-Leninist world view of the working class."[5]

Cultural progress is now inseparably linked to the implementation of the principal task: to achieve--on the basis of an accelerated production growth rate, great efficiency, scientific-technological progress and rapid increases in labor productivity--steady improvement of the people's material and cultural standard of living.

If we want our culture to contribute to continued social progress in the intellectual struggles of our time, it is imperative that we still more effectively make use of the possibilities it offers in regard to the development of the personality and of consciousness.

Culture and the Development of Socialist Consciousness

We need a differentiated, interesting cultural life. It is true of the overall national framework and of any place, of the atmosphere in the work collective or of that in the family that "the degree of stimulation provided by culture and art, the extent to which they help satisfy and form intellectual and moral requirements depends to a large extent on the well-being of the people and on whether their life is a rich one in the cultural sense as well."[6]

Systematically, our Party is trying further to develop /socialist-realistic art/. Regardless of what artistic measures it uses to express itself, its criteria are based on the deep inner links with the reality of socialism and the life of the people, on the consistent party spirit, with which it advocates peace, democracy and socialism and opposes imperialism, aggression and reaction, on the clear socialist ideas and on its solidarity with the people. Thanks to the range and diversity of its--surely not nearly fully exploited--artistic possibilities, socialist-realistic art can exert an influence on the most diverse personal inclinations and interests. It can influence the life of the people, form attitudes toward life, develop socialist convictions and communist ideals and help to foster a sense of beauty.

According to Brecht, socialist-realistic art has "the noble task to contribute to the radical reorganization of the way in which the people live together."[7] In this respect, GDR art has provided strong impulses. Especially noteworthy are the contributions of children's literature and other forms of art.

Erich Honecker emphasized that "...we know of course that not all writers and artists are Marxists-Leninists."[8] However, the GDR's artistic world offers a broad range of opportunities to any artistic endeavor, as long as it furthers--without stabbing real socialism in the back--humanistic ideas and advocates peace, democracy, antifascism and anti-imperialist solidarity. The creative talents and concerns, the life and work experience of the individual artists differ greatly. However, it is bound to be beneficial, if each individual artist is and remains called upon to make as great a contribution to the development of the socialist personality as he or she is capable on the basis of his or her personal circumstances and if each individual's efforts in this regard are appreciated.[9]

To a large extent, our social progress is stimulated by the social awareness inherent in the creative activities of the masses--by motives that they derive from the Marxist-Leninist world view: to be a driving force of the historic creativity of the working class and of the working people--it is toward this that the structures and functions of socialist intellectual culture are presently oriented.

Thomas Mann once confessed "that it was an error of the German bourgeoisie to believe that a cultured individual could be apolitical."[10] /Political culture/ is an integral part of socialism: Lenin held that it was of crucial importance in regard to "the establishment of a state without capitalists, without exploiters, without landowners."[11] Political culture requires not only extensive political knowledge; it is only through the combination of such knowledge with a firm, class-oriented point of view, with a high degree of organization and discipline, with fervent mental commitment and constant readiness for action and combat that we can attain the level of culture required today.

The /education/ that we provide in the schools and through many forms of life-long learning develops appreciation of the laws of development in nature and society. According to Engels, education based on socialist ideas aims above all to heighten the people's awareness so that they can perceive more clearly the laws governing their own social activities--laws that formerly were alien natural laws controlling them--that they can use them with growing expertise and thus increasingly control them.[12] Thus, education--a cultural element of the greatest importance--must be increasingly used to form /creative/ faculties and attitudes.

In our society, to which irrationality and mysticism are entirely alien, importance of the sciences as a /cultural factor/ is noticeably increasing. Academy President Prof Dr Werner Scheler stated that the sciences are a "vital part of the culture of a people, indeed of mankind as a whole." This applies not only to their immediate influence on the productive forces. Science "lays essential foundations for the education and training of the people and helps to develop the specific cultural characteristics of a nation as well as the personality of the individual citizen."[13] Today it is more important than ever to be mindful of the fact that decades ago the

great artist Maxim Gorki "seriously and consciously" ranked the sciences among the most important creative forces concerning the "development of social modes of conduct."[14]

In accordance with our present circumstances, such modes of conduct should be oriented above all toward insuring increased intensity of public work, maximum efficiency of socialist production, a high rate of acceleration of scientific-technological progress, etc. It would be inconsistent with the structures and functions of the new, socialist type of intellectual culture, if we kept aloof on this crucial battlefield of socialism. Just two factors should be singled out here:

Firstly, there is the new interrelationship of /work and culture/, which is being realized by socialism. L. I. Brezhnev called the "historic linking of work and culture," which the best minds so far have only dreamed about, "a turning point of tremendous significance" for the entire history of world culture.[15]

Freed from exploitation, socialist work becomes the supportive foundation of the cultural creativity of the masses and helps to form the substance of the cultural values of socialism. It is not without good reason that conscientious, honest and socially useful work is considered the cornerstone of the socialist way of life. The orientation toward this factor of the development of socialist culture begins with an element of education that is characteristic of our society--the polytechnical character of the school and the validity of principles of work education for all students. This orientation is upheld through the concern about a socialist work culture--appropriate to our social level--"in all places of work and learning."[16] It is reflected in the personality-forming values of the socialist performance principle. This principle calls for the release of a maximum of intellectual-creative capacities, of skills, knowledge, talent and imagination, expressed in the will and ability to work for one's own benefit and in the interest of one's own personality and for the benefit of society. Thus this principle reflects the absolute laws of the development "of the /social/ character of /personal/ talents, faculties and activities."[17]

Secondly, we would like to draw attention to the raising of the /cultural-technological level/. The intensification of production and the development of science and technology make heavy demands on education and training.[18] These requirements are concerned not only with professional qualifications and specialized skills. Equally necessary are an increased aptitude for technological creativity, familiarity with extensive production structures and economic interrelationships, responsibility for the quality of one's own work, striving for a high degree of efficiency, including an efficient use of time, etc. Thus we should also ask ourselves, if Brecht's exhortation applies not only to the theatrical world, but to the socialist intellectual life as a whole: "Afford pleasure about the possibility of controlling the human condition through society."[19]

More so than any other work collective, a pedagogical collective is confronted with the task /to integrate the totality of the consciousness- and personality-forming capacities of the intellectual culture of socialism in its own work/. This goes far beyond the specific requirements of the individual subjects concerned. The common denominator of these efforts is the collective endeavor to develop moral values, by means of which it is possible to meet social and individual requirements in the process of overcoming the contradictions between the conduct of the individual and the interests of society.[20] Thus the demands raised at the Eighth Pedagogical Congress are applicable here: "Education must bring the individual to view all that which is necessary, correct, good and just for our cause as correct, good, just for itself as well and to act accordingly."[21]

This is a key aspect of long-range tasks, in regard to which Kurt Hager stated: "In all fields, we must develop and enforce /our/ socialist position, /our/ value criteria, /our/ attitude toward life, /our/ social psychology. Socialist culture includes man's entire intellectual, moral, aesthetic and emotional level of development, the totality of his knowledge, skills, talents, modes of conduct, attitudes, convictions, social habits and pleasures. All these elements are reflected in cultural requirements."[22]

Development of Socialist Cultural Requirements

Lenin taught that the goal of socialism is the "safeguarding of the maximum well-being and of the free all-round development of all members of society."[23] It is to this end that our Party developed the unity of social and economic policy. In accordance with the basic economic law of socialism, this unity helps better and better to meet the material and cultural requirements.

Of necessity, the development of public work leads to "a steadily expanding and increasingly comprehensive system of types of work and production, which is paralleled by a complex, steadily expanding system of requirements."[24] An actual abundance of requirements--i.e. the opposite not only of a lack of intellectual requirements, but also of a seeming abundance of requirements, which, however, can be reduced to the one "requirement of /possessing/"--is a cultural factor of the first order. Marx speaks of the "culture incorporating all traits of the social individual," which is based on this factor, and of developing "a social individual that has many needs, because it has many traits and relationships."[25] The education and training of cultured, universally educated socialist personalities presuppose an abundance of "real and ideal relationships" on their part;[26] but this is inseparably bound up with diverse material and cultural requirements, both in regard to the individual and in regard to the socialist way of life as a whole.

In the 1970's in particular, the development of cultural requirements was quite dynamic thanks to the concentration on the principal task. The general, 10-grade polytechnical high school was introduced throughout the

country for all children and juveniles; this measure put the development of cultural requirements on a qualitatively new basis.

A number of data should be quoted here. During the period from 1970 to 1978, the following increases were registered: The number of participants in the competition for the title of "Collective of Socialist Work"--to 179.9 percent; the total number of innovators in the national economy--to 257.5 percent; annual yield of the innovator results produced--to 184.3 percent; the total number of participants in the Fairs of the Masters of Tomorrow--to 394.8 percent.[27]

These figures represent more than just economic facts. They stand for considerable "cultural investments" of reflection, interests, creativity, talents and diverse skills, intellectual flexibility and social responsibility. This indicates how the individual's creative approach to his or her own work begins to manifest itself--more or less steadily--as a basic cultural need.

The "rate of consumption" of cultural goods and services is not the primary criterion of the developmental level of cultural requirements. Nevertheless, their significance should not be underrated. In regard to the most important items, the level of cultural requirements is higher in the GDR than in the developed capitalist countries, including the FRG.

In 1978, 98.2 percent of GDR households were equipped with radio receivers, while 86.5 percent owned a TV set. (In regard to television sets, the GDR is among the European countries distinguished by a high degree of market saturation.) The per capita production of books and brochures amounted to 8.3 copies, and the corresponding figures for journals and newspapers were 14.5 and 181.7, respectively; 30.2 percent of the population are registered users of public libraries; thus our republic occupies a leading position among the "reading countries." The figures of attendance (per 1,000 residents) at cultural events are as follows: Movies: 4,795; theater: 634; concerts: 189; clubs and cultural establishments: 3,467; events of the Cultural League: 342; Urania lectures: 698; museums: 1,920; zoos: 840. And of every 1,000 GDR citizens, 755 traveled abroad.[28]

It would be unrealistic to regard cultural requirements as "purely intellectual", as far removed from all requirements of material and physical pleasures. Thus Friedrich Engels pointed out--and we need only recall here the cultural aspect of our housing construction program: "The satisfaction of the need for shelter will become a criterion of the way in which all other needs are met."[29] And further: "A truly humane enjoyment of life"[30] is an integral part of the socialist way of life. Margot Honecker broached the question whether one should oppose the young people's desire to acquire beautiful and pleasurable things--because the enemy hopes they will turn bourgeois. It would be anachronistic "to educate the young people so as to prevent them from developing material demands. In keeping with the growing influence of the moral stimuli, the principle of material interests will

remain for a long time to come a significant driving force of development. In regard to education, it is of crucial importance that our young people realize that one's demands can be met only through one's own work, that they know: One cannot live at the expense of others; one must not place one's own well-being above that of other people."31

Pedagogical collectives in particular should look for ways of overcoming instances of a lack of cultural requirements. The endeavor to attain a high level of "culture of requirements" includes the attitude, in regard to which the SED Program states: "The Party emphatically opposes heartlessness and inconsiderateness in human relations; it opposes hypocrisy, cynicism and disgraceful conduct vis-a-vis the opposite sex. It demands that everyone wage a determined struggle against violations of the law, against asocial conduct and rowdyism and against abuse of alcohol."32

Nobody denies the fact that in regard to certain "beautiful things" that are attractive to young people in particular, we do not always match the offerings of capitalist enterprises. Especially in this regard, we must see to it that consideration of individual elements does not distort the correct view of the whole.

The intellectual-cultural class struggle--which is especially intense at the point of contact between the antagonistic systems--goes far beyond the confrontation of ideological thought systems and political principles. The struggle in regard to needs and demand structures is no less intense. The enemy pins his hopes on the effects produced by three TV programs and approximately 2 dozen radio stations, on many personal encounters with citizens of an imperialist state, on a network of ties that in one way or another links us with the material commodity "culture" of capitalism. It is impossible to isolate young people from all this--even though our educational principles naturally prohibit granting "Western" television programs or "Western" plastic bags the status of "equal" intellectual or material cultural phenomena. We must educate the young people so as to enable them to deal with such phenomena and influences from an /independent as well as party- and class-based position/ and also to refuse--out of personal civic pride--to advertise the products of any capitalist concern. It is not only individual phenomena that are at issue. We are concerned with making clear the /contrary/ development of needs in antagonistic social systems--a development that is contrary even when individual needs focus on identical objects or services. The system of cultural requirements in the capitalist society develops--as a social rule, not as an automatism of all individual demands--/not/ as a need for greater humaneness, for greater personality values. The description of the capitalist "culture" of the development of demands, which was given by the young Marx in 1844, is still applicable today: "All that which capitalism takes from you in the form of life and of humanity, all that it replaces by /money/ and /riches/, and all that which you are not able to do, your money is able to do: It can eat and drink, it can go to the ball and to the theater, it is able (to acquire) art, erudition, the historical rarities...; it is the true /property/." As

far as the worker is concerned in this connection, he may "have only so much that he wants to live and he must want to live only in order to have."[33] In this connection, Marx also analyzed the "refinement of demands" as an ultimately merely /"seeming/ satisfaction of demands," as "civilization /within/ the crude barbarism of the demand."[34]

Socialism renders possible the satisfaction of growing, individually differentiated material and cultural demands by means of a development that is an element of real humanism. Here it is possible to accomplish what Marx stated at that time: "Assuming that /man/ is a /humane being/ and that his relationship to the world is a humane one, then love can be obtained only in return for love, trust only in return for trust, etc. Whoever wants to enjoy art must be an artistically educated person; whoever wants to exert influence on other people must be a person who has a truly stimulating and encouraging effect on other people."[35]

The GDR's Socialist National Culture--Accomplishment and Source of Strength of the Victorious Working Class

The flowering of the socialist national culture is prerequisite to the development of the socialist German nation in the GDR. The characteristics of this nation are determined above all by the victorious working class.

In the FRG, certain circles are talking more and more insistently--and stridently--of "keeping open the German question." However, the historical dice in regard to the birth, existence and successful development of the socialist nation on the soil of the GDR have irrevocably been cast. What is there "to be kept open"? Surely just "Great-German" claims nurtured by hopes--and not infrequently, wild plans--of someday advancing again the domain of German imperialism up to the Oder and Neisse rivers and then filling--at least--the "borders of 1937." These feverish political fantasies that reveal the aggressive character of German imperialism are for the most part based on cultural dreams. For formulas such as "unity of the German national culture" or "common history, culture and language as vital braces of national unity in the past, present and future" sound rather peaceful. Such talk would not merit any attention, if it were not a "cultural-historical" or "cultural-critical" veneer and justification of a policy fundamentally opposed to detente and if it did not represent an attempt at interference in the internal affairs of the sovereign GDR. Especially inflammatory in this respect is the resolution concerning the "German question in education," which was adopted in November 1978 by the Permanent Conference of the Senators and Ministers of Education of the FRG States. There are diverse activities that are clearly indicative of an acute aggravation of the class struggle in the intellectual-cultural realm and of its interconnection with the fate of peace and security in Europe. It is one of the key axioms of the enemy's argumentation that the GDR must not be recognized, at least not as an independent intellectual-cultural reality, and that anything characteristic of the GDR, anything that is related to the development of the socialist German nation, should be denied and--at first intellectually--eliminated and eradicated.

However, the existence of the GDR's socialist German national culture is an irrevocable fact. All objective analyses have shown that neither in its social traits and substantive characteristics nor in its cultural-historical position and inner structures, nor in its functions concerning national life is there any "unity" or "common ground" or even the slightest tendency toward "agreement" with the dominant imperialist culture in the FRG, in which great power-chauvinist, revanchist and hegemonic characteristics are becoming more and more apparent. Our GDR culture has long been historically confirmed as the German culture of real socialism, in which the people of the GDR give expression to and participate in the implementation of their national self-determination.

The principal factors that prove the socialist German national culture--which is characterized by the dominant influence of the victorious working class--to be a culture of a new historical type are the following: Firstly, the socialist national culture of the GDR is developing as the /culture of the victorious working class and of all working people led by the Marxist-Leninist Party/. The emergence of a socialist intelligentsia, primarily from the ranks of the workers and farmers, is one of the most important culturally creative achievements of the working class. Its alliance with this socialist intelligentsia (which naturally includes the productive pedagogical intelligentsia) is a vital source of our cultural progress. This progress is taking place on socialism's "own foundations." For all the specific inherent laws of the various forms of culture, the overall cultural development is subject to the crucial influence of the basic laws governing the development of the advanced socialist society.

Secondly: Culture in particular gives expression--and not only linguistic expression--to those special, peculiar characteristics that distinguish one nation from another. However, these characteristics are not imposed on it by ethnic factors or by its historical origins. Its /present and future-oriented definition/ is taking place primarily in the interaction of all concrete social, economic, intellectual and other processes, in the dialectics of all internal and external conditions under which the developed socialism is maturing. We are fully aware of the fact that the tasks we are confronted with are great and difficult ones. But we take pride in our accomplishments in the field of cultural mass activities, in national education, in literature, in the arts and sciences, in physical education and sports, etc.; this is a justified national pride that we are not willing to share with just any concern director or stockbroker.

This patriotism, which--closely bound up with proletarian internationalism--is a distinguishing characteristic of our culture, is concerned with the historical position, the revolutionary prospects, the history and assured future, the country and state of the GDR, with the respect it enjoys--closely allied with the USSR--in the community of socialist states. Our patriotism comprises the will to defend all the accomplishments, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our homeland against any imperialist machinations.

Thirdly: Our socialist German national culture gives expression to and defines the position that our republic--the work of the victorious working class--occupies in the entire history of the German people. It represents a type of fundamentally new national-historical interrelationships.

These interrelationships preclude national arrogance, chauvinism and racism. They do not leave any room for ethnic or religious hatred; they are free from the pernicious spirit of anticommunism and from national nihilism and cosmopolitanism. Our culture is firmly rooted in the traditions of the German people's centuries-old struggle for social progress. It is indebted to all humanistic, progressive and revolutionary accomplishments in German history, to every instance of opposition to reaction. Our culture values especially highly

--all the revolutionary uprisings and intellectual programs that demanded freedom and justice for the working people;

--the material, intellectual and moral values created by the masses;

--the rich historical and cultural heritage of the revolutionary German workers' movement; the morality of the bloody struggle against the supremacy of capitalism and imperialism, against militarism, fascism and wars of conquest;

--the--already quite significant--cultural achievements of real socialism on German soil.

Our culture is closely connected with all those elements that have united progressive endeavors in the history of our people with those of other nations.

Fourthly: Our socialist national culture is giving rise to /a new historic type of relationship to the cultural achievements of other nations/--inspired by Lenin's "principle of internationalism and of an intransigent struggle against the contamination of the proletariat with bourgeois nationalism, even in its most refined form."[36] Being essentially /worldly/, it is imbued with the spirit of international friendship and of respect for the humanistic cultural achievements of /all/ nations. Thus new patterns and structures in international cultural relations are being established.

The growth of our "own" culture is connected with an ever-expanding process of rapprochement and mutual enrichment among the socialist national cultures in the fraternal countries. It is primarily through the links with the multinational Soviet culture and the cultures of the other socialist countries that proletarian internationalism, one of the basic assets of our culture, is growing stronger.

Our culture is prepared to accept anti-imperialist-democratic and socialist elements of the capitalist countries. The relations with such cultural

elements in the FRG are developing on the basis of the opposition to the imperialism predominant in that country.

Solidarity-inspired relations with frequently age-old and presently rejuvenating cultures of peoples that have freed themselves from colonial or semicolonial servitude, from national or racist subjugation are becoming increasingly important. This goes above all for socialist-oriented countries.

Fifthly: Like the other countries of real socialism, the GDR--in extensively developing its socialist national culture--is making a noble /contribution to the international culture of socialism/, the most important phenomenon of the world culture of our time. Thus it is opening up a vital source of power for advancing social progress.

Considering the diverse aspects of a cultural policy formulated and directed by the SED Program, we can justly say: "Since its foundation, our Party has been carrying out a cultural policy that implements the most noble aspirations of the humanistic and revolutionary champions of mankind."[37]

FOOTNOTES

1. Erich Honecker, "Die Kulturpolitik unserer Partei wird erfolgreich verwirklicht" [The Cultural Policy of Our Party is Being Successfully Implemented], Berlin, 1979, pp 42-43.

2. V. I. Lenin, "Werke" [Complete Works], Vol 33, p 454.

3. Ibid., p 461.

4. Ibid., p 475.

5. "Programm der SED" [SED Program], Berlin, 1976, p 22.

6. "Bericht des ZK der SED an den IX. Parteitag der SED. Berichterstatter: Genosse Erich Honecker" [Report of the SED Central Committee to the Ninth SED Congress, Delivered by Comrade Erich Honecker], Berlin, 1976, p 102.

7. Bertolt Brecht, "Schriften zum Theater" [Writings on the Theater], Vol 7, Berlin, 1964, p 338.

8. Erich Honecker, "Die Kulturpolitik...," op. cit., p 52.

9. Kurt Hager, "Zu Fragen der Kulturpolitik der SED" [Observations on Problems Concerning the Cultural Policy of the SED], Berlin, 1972, p 48.

10. Thomas Mann, "Gesammelte Werke" [Complete Works], Vol 12, Berlin, 1955, p 829.

11. V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 31, pp 362-363.

12. Friedrich Engels, "Anti-Duehring," in: Marx/Engels, "Werke" [Complete Works], Vol 20, p 264.

13. Werner Scheler, "Zur Rolle der Wissenschaften im Kulturleben der DDR" [On the Role of the Sciences in the Cultural Life of the GDR], Berlin, 1978, p 7.

14. Ibid., p 4.

15. L. I. Brezhnev, "The Great Socialist October Revolution and the Progress of Mankind," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 3 Nov 77, p 3.

16. "Programm der SED," op. cit., p 50.

17. Karl Marx, "Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie" [Outlines of Criticism of Political Economy], Berlin, 1953, p 80.

18. "Programm der SED," op. cit., p 50.

19. B. Brecht, "Schriften...," op. cit., p 341.

20. "Die Moral der entwickelten sozialistischen Gesellschaft" [The Morality of the Developed Socialist Society], Berlin, 1979, p 44.

21. Margot Honecker, "VIII. Paedagogischer Kongress der DDR" [Eighth GDR Pedagogical Congress], Berlin, 1979, p 64.

22. Kurt Hager, op. cit., p 13.

23. V. I. Lenin, "Werke," Vol 6, p 40.

24. Karl Marx, "Grundrisse...," op. cit., p 313.

25. Ibid., p 312.

26. Ibid., p 440.

27. Calculated on the basis of the GDR Statistical Yearbook for 1979.

28. Data based on: Ibid.

29. Friedrich Engels, "Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England" [The Position of the Working Class in England], in: Marx/Engels, "Werke" [Complete Works], Vol 2, p 297.

30. Friedrich Engels, "Two Speeches in Elberfeld," in Marx/Engels, op. cit., Vol 2, p 556.

31. Margot Honecker, "Protokoll des IX. Parteitages der SED" [Minutes of the Ninth SED Congress], Vol 1, Berlin, 1976, pp 292-293.

32. "Programm der SED," op. cit., p 56.

33. Karl Marx, "Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts (1844)," in: Marx/Engels, op. cit., Supplement, Part I, pp 549-550.

34. Ibid., p 552.

35. Ibid., p 567.

36. V. I. Lenin, "Werke," Vol 20, p 12.

37. E. Honecker, "Die Kulturpolitik...," op. cit., p 37.

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PRUSSIAN HISTORY TO BE ACCEPTED AS PART OF GDR 'HERITAGE'

Honecker on Frederick the Great

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Aug 80 p 5.

[Article signed 'Ws,' datelined Berlin, 26 August: "Honecker Speaks of Frederick the Great; Travel Restrictions To Be Eased--Only If Bonn Recognizes GDR Citizenship--An Interview"]

[Text] SED General Secretary Honecker has made clear in an interview that the GDR will refuse to reduce the age-limit for GDR inhabitants allowed to travel to the west as long as the FRG is unwilling to recognize GDR citizenship. "Serious obstacles on the part of the FRG opposed" the lowering of the travel age-limit, Honecker said. "We have often called for eliminating them but have thus far only met with refusal. That is true mainly of the recognition of GDR citizenship." Because the FRG did not recognize GDR citizenship, it was impossible to make headway in other fields such as legal aid and travel. When asked about the "Prussia Renaissance" in the GDR, Honecker intimated that Rauch's famous equestrian statue of Frederick the Great was going to be reerected in the center of East Berlin.

The utterances by the SED general secretary are included in an interview composed of 50 questions and answers given to the British publisher Maxwell as early as 4 July. Its text, now published by ADN, also is contained in an autobiographical book by Honecker that has now also been published by Maxwell's publishing house Pergamon Press under the title "Aus meinem Leben" (From My Life) in the FRG. Last Monday, on his 68th birthday, Honecker was handed the first copy of the book by the publisher.

In the interview, of which an excerpt was published in the 5 July issue of the SED's central organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Honecker further said about the relations between the two Germanys: "All in all, the relations are not bad but could still be better." But that was not an easy matter to achieve. The problem was that certain FRG circles still had not realized that "the GDR is no enclave of the FRG." In Honecker's view, the development of relations between the two German states had good prospects. What mattered was to make still better use than so far of existing possibilities with

regard for common interests. An improvement of the climate between the two German states, "which we are seeking," could benefit the many-sided GDR-FRG communication, including travel.

The FRG's refusal to recognize GDR citizenship did not prevent the GDR, however, from being generous in humanitarian matters. That was indicated by the figures on travel for urgent family business. There were, after all 1.5 million GDR inhabitants already traveling to western countries annually. "Yet generosity is one thing. The other thing is that in the FRG, subsidized out of the federal budget, regional organizations are still up to their tricks, pushing so-called homeland claims against the GDR, Poland and the CSSR, and often agitating for revenge." Honecker continued: "If it were up to us, the situation could be different. But up to this point, conditions in the FRG evidently do not allow further steps."

'Understanding History in Its Objective Course'

With respect to the SED's relation with German history, the SED General Secretary said: "We foster not only revolutionary, socialist traditions . . . but it conforms with our image of the world to understand history in its objective, actual course, in its overall dialectics. That inlcudes looking at the greatness and the limits of outstanding historical personalities." By now appreciating the historic achievement of Luther and Clausewitz, the SED wholly followed the traditions of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, that of the German workers movement "and our history since 1945." By no means did one thereby ignore the limits of one personality or another, their negative features, their contradictory attitudes or the historic tragedy in which they had been enmeshed.

With reference to the publication of Ingrid Mittenzwei's biography of Frederick II of Prussia in the GDR, which was sold out at once, the interviewer asked Honecker whether that did not amount to a "breakthrough." Honecker answered: "Ingrid Mittenzwei's biography of Frederick the Great, a work which I have great regard for, incidentally, without necessarily endorsing every sentence in it, is from that vantage point no 'breakthrough' but an outcome of our attitude toward our heritage. That also includes the history of Prussia. As you have properly noticed, in the center of our capital, Berlin, there are monuments to Clausewitz, Scharnhorst, Yorck and Gneisenau. Perhaps Rauch's monument to Frederick the Great will be added in the foreseeable future. That would replenish, so to speak, the rebuilt arena of Unter den Linden in the center of Berlin. All this should surprise nobody. Every German land had things that were progressive as well as reactionary in the past, and the monuments usually were created by famous sculptors. It is all part of the culture of our people."

These utterances by Honecker are remarkable in more than one respect. First because he is the first GDR party and government chief to publicly use, unabashedly, the designation "Frederick the Great" for the Prussian king, which had been taboo up to now. Thus far they would always only refer to King Frederick II of Prussia. Secondly, Honecker is in error in saying that,

along with the monuments to Scharnhorst, Yorck and Gneisenau, there also was one of Carl von Clausewitz in the center of East Berlin. In the park around the Unter den Linden opera coffeehouse, four monuments to famous Prussian generals were reerected, to be sure, in 1964, yet along with Rauch's marble Scharnhorst monument, these are the bronze monuments to Ludwig Count Yorck von Wartenburg (1759-1830), August Count Neidhardt von Gneisenau (1760-1831), and Gebhard Leberecht Prince Bluecher (1742-1819). Not Clausewitz then, the theoretician whose 200th birthday was recently celebrated in the GDR, but Bluecher, the man of practice, "Marshal Forward," is the one who was immortalized here. There is no Clausewitz monument in East Berlin.

Finally, Honecker's remark about the equestrian statue of Frederick the Great seems to support the rumors to the effect that for the 200th anniversary of his death in 1986 the monument to the great Prussian king would again stand where it belongs: Unter den Linden in Berlin. The equestrian statue of Frederick the Great--the king on horseback, set on a multi-step pedestal and adorned with rich pieces of sculpture, created by Christian Daniel Rauch in 1851 and unveiled on Unter den Linden--was removed from Berlin under Ulbricht in 1950 and placed, somewhat hidden, in the Sanssouci Park of Potsdam, in the "Hippodrome," in 1961. It rates as one of the most magnificent monumental sculptures of the 19th century in Germany.

GDR Historian's Frederick II Biography

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Feb 80 p 12

[Article by Peter Jochen Winters, datelined Berlin, in February: "East Berlin Has Second Thoughts About Prussia--Much Attention Paid to a Biography of Frederick the Great." A translation of the below cited East Berlin EINHEIT article, coauthored by Biographer Ingrid Mittenzwei, follows the Winters article. For an official FRG analysis of this EINHEIT article see JPRS 73990, 10 Aug 79, No 1706 of this series, pp 11-13. The text of an East Berlin interview with Dr Mittenzwei on her biography is available in JPRS 74590, 16 Nov 79, No 1738 of this series, pp 95-99. For a West German analysis of the development of GDR historiography see JPRS 75760, 23 May 80, No 1788 of this series, pp 41-68]

[Text] In East Berlin you can find people who are willing to make a bet that the equestrian statue of Frederick II, completed by Christian Daniel Rauch in 1851, will on the 200th anniversary of the great Prussian King's death, in 1986, stand again where it belongs: Unter den Linden in Berlin. Yet things are not likely to go that far, after the German communists in 1950 removed the bronze monument--an equestrian statue set on a multi-step pedestal and adorned with rich pieces of sculpture--and reerected it in 1961, somewhat hidden, in the Sanssouci park of Potsdam, the so-called "Hippodrome." What seems more realistic is the speculation that the equestrian statue of Frederick the Great will be assigned a representative spot commensurate with its importance as one of the most magnificent monumental sculptures of the 19th century in the park of Sanssouci.

Sold Out After a Few Days

Yet it is not art that is involved here but history. And if the people in East Berlin are willing to make the bet we referred to above, the reason is that the GDR now has discovered its interest in Frederick the Great--not last, presumably, because of the big exhibition, "Prussia--Attempt at an Accounting," scheduled to be held in West Berlin in 1981. So also, the first GDR biography of Frederick II of Prussia recently came out, and it was sold out within a few days. (Ingrid Mittenzwei: "Frederick II of Prussia," VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, East Berlin). When its author--she is the department chief for "German History from 1684 to 1789" at the Central Institute for History at the GDR Academy of Sciences--gave a lecture about the great king late last year in East Berlin's municipal library, the lecture hall was as crowded as a few weeks later, when the topic was Frederick II and the architecture of his time.

Increased attention to Prussian history has been unmistakable among the GDR's historians in recent years. "A deeper understanding of history strengthens the citizens' bonds with their socialist fatherland and enhances their pride in the achievements of the socialist revolution," SED General Secretary Honecker announced last summer, whereby he underscored the efforts of the SED leadership to distill and take over from German history its "positive historic traditions." "We cannot deal with German history without reworking Prussian history," is the historians' argument over there, and Ingrid Mittenzwei has this to add to it: "Our discussions of our concept of legacy have now also made apparent that now, after mainly having concentrated on the revolutionary traditions of the workers class and the humanistic traditions, we must also deal more with the history of the exploiter class." In application to Prussia this means: After the GDR historians have already dealt in detail with the Prussian reformers of from 1807 to 1813, Stein and Hardenberg, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, Clausewitz and even Lt Gen Yorck von Wartenburg, who in the last days of December in 1812, and in opposition to the order from his king, signed the Tauroggen Convention, which all was added, as "positive traditions," to the integral part of the GDR's historic "legacy," the time had come to deal with Frederick II, a representative of what was then the "ruling class."

But the time of painting history in black and white is long past in the GDR also. In "necessarily fighting against and turning down everything reactionary in Prussia" one should not "slight or negate its positive progressive elements," leading GDR historians warned some time ago in the SED's theoretical journal EINHEIT. As positive and progressive features and developments in Prussian history they now referred to "certain progressive measures taken by some Prussian rulers," mainly pointing to Frederick I and Frederick II. "The development of socialist society in the GDR, where the social roots of Prussianism were eliminated, requires of us, however, to tap and to integrate with our store of traditions all the positive and progressive achievements and traditions in Prussian history as well," EINHEIT said at that time. This is a maxim Ingrid Mittenzwei has taken to heart in her Frederick II biography, hailed by the critics as an "enrichment of our historical literature" and evidently read by the population.

Seeking Specific Differences

The author seeks to approach Frederick II of Prussia with discernment. She calls him "an exceedingly contradictory historical figure," and she acknowledges he had surpassed the level of 18th century German monarchical grandeur and, as "a most sensitive representative of his class" he then had reacted to the transitional character of his time with a policy of accommodation. So he had, in his domestic policy, banked on limited reforms which never, however, went beyond the framework of the existing order. Frederick II, who died shortly before the French Revolution, had been a man who had, to be sure, received impulses from the newly evolving era and reacted to it "in seeking to adapt his backward country to the new conditions," but who at the same time--"chained to the conditions of his class and of his country"--erected dams against the new society. Yet--says the Frederick biographer--"the dialectics of history had the effect that what existed could no longer be preserved without adaptability and flexibility."

At the end of her book Ingrid Mittenzwei makes some remarks about "Frederick II and His Posterity" and reaches the following remarkable conclusion: "Frederick II never pursued national goals. Which then means there was no plain continuity between Frederick's policy and that of Junker Bismarck nor any direct line leading from Frederick II via Bismarck up to Hitler, as has sometimes been maintained after World War II." The Nazis had been the ones to draw the line from Frederick the Great via Bismarck to Hitler so as to present themselves as Prussia's genuine heirs. After the war, the Allies held on to this legend and used it not only to justify the dissolution of the Prussian state by the control council law of the Allies but also to condemn everything Prussian altogether. The blowing up of the city palace in East Berlin and the demounting of the equestrian statue of Frederick II are likely to have been a result of that legend too, against which FRG historians came out early in showing that it was not tenable. That the GDR now also bids farewell to that legend is an encouraging sign.

Prussian Progressive Traditions

East Berlin EINHEIT in German Vol 34 No 6, Jun 79 signed to press 9 May 79 pp 637-646

[Article by Prof Dr Horst Bartel, member, GDR Academy of Sciences; director of academy's Central Institute for History; Dr Ingrid Mittenzwei, department head in same institute; and Prof Dr Walter Schmidt, director, Institute for History of German Workers Movement, Academy of Social Sciences, SED Central Committee: "Prussia and German History"]

> [Text] The history of Prussia belongs to our historic legacy in its totality, and its various elements are in relation to which we define our standpoint from the positions of the victorious workers class. Any one-sidedness or any absolute terms are alien to our Marxist-Leninist image of

> Prussian history. It brings to the fore the reactionary features that are inevitably connected with the development of that state image and at the same time also includes the historically grown positive values due to the efforts of progressive forces there as well which, like everything else that was progressive in German history, are integrated within the GDR's store of tradition.

The GDR maintains a clear and unequivocal relationship with its historic premises. Its historic roots reach far back into the history of the German people. "Our socialist state," as the appeal for the 30th anniversary of the founding of the GDR says, "typifies all that is best in German history, in the same way as it marks a complete break with all that is reactionary."[1] We take our stand vis-a-vis the historic legacy from our German past in its entirety, the good as the bad, but we define clearly and unmistakably, from the positions of the victorious workers class, our standpoint on the various components of this legacy.

An integral part of this legacy is the history of Prussia, one of the largest, strongest and most important German territorial states that had a great influence on German history since the late 17th century. That state had a contradictory development. That contradictoriness it is precisely that forces us to define more accurately our position on the historic legacy left behind by Prussia lest we slight, or even negate, over our necessary fight against and rejection of what was reactionary in Prussia, its positive, progressive elements. Because Prussian history also had reactionary as well as progressive elements.

Joining the issue about Prussian history is all the more urgent since bourgeois ideologues and historians are increasingly seeking to draw a picture of Prussia as they see fit, one which contradicts historic truth. Two trends in it are unmistakable. On the one side, they keep spreading the old conservative variant which more or less glorifies the Prussian state. On the other, flexible bourgeois historians, notably those with a bent for social and cultural history, seek to convey a more discriminating image of Prussia that also will provide critical emphases. Yet ultimately this partial criticism of Prussia serves to justify the FRG's current imperialist system. These efforts enjoy the massive political and financial support by those who have a say in Bonn and West Berlin. That is indicated, for instance, by the exhibition, "Prussia--Attempt of an Accounting," now being prepared on the recommendation and under the patronage of the lord mayor of West Berlin and with the involvement of FRG government authorities, as well as by the recently illegally opened Prussian state library on cultural values. There, in his opening speech, FRG President Walter Scheel ballyhooed the thesis of Prussia as a so-called constitutional state.

In contrast to the clearly academic scholarship in historiography, it unequivocally is the conservative version of the bourgeois image of Prussia which predominates in FRG journalism and mass media. That is the direction in which many newspaper articles, television programs, magazine essays and also the recently published book by journalist Sebastian Haffner, "Preussen ohne Legende," move.[2] They seek to do away with the inseparable continuity between the German Empire as founded in 1871 and reactionary Prussianism. With all the criticism journalism bestows on Prussia, its basic tenor lies in the attempt to undo the reactionary class line from the old Prussian state down to the German Empire and its destruction and the subsequent disbandment of Prussia. It means a whitewash of reactionary Prussianism, exonerating it of its historic coresponsibility for the unleashing of two world wars and the fascist rule of terror.

The Dialectics of Two Class Lines

A scientific analysis of German history shows that in the Prussian state factors predominated over long periods that obstructed all progress, due to specific historic conditions. That was due principally to the privileged position of the feudal landowners and, later, of the junkers with their capitalist economy. Absolutism in Prussia let the nobility keep its extraordinary economic and social privileges and fully surrendered to it the peasants forced into serfdom. Also during the transition to capitalism in the 19th century, the nobility, now, in the "Prussian way," putting on airs as a class of the capitalist society, retained its economic, social and political power positions, by which it could continue its reactionary influence.

In this special role of the Prussian aristocratic and junkers' class is rooted the ominous continuity of militarism ranging from late feudalism to imperialism. The militarization of society, this late feudal militarism that started under King Frederick Wilhelm I, by preserving its class foundations in the 19th century, then grew into the militarism of the junkers and capitalists and, eventually, into a dangerous symbiosis with German imperialism which had come too late when the world was divided up. Thus Prussia became and remained the incarnation of militarism in the world. It pervaded all of public life and produced pride of place, nationalistic arrogance and a spirit of aggression as much as submissiveness, slavish obedience, hypocricy and bigoted offialdom.

Those were the concomitants of reactionary Prussianism which had for its maxims the suppression of any democratic aspirations within and aggressiveness against the outside. All progressive forces in German history found themselves in bitter struggle against Prussianism. Nor did Prussia have any "German calling," as bourgeois ideology has been pretending, despite some voices to the contrary, but up to the early 1860's was engaged in nothing but naked big power politics to extract maximum profits from a Germany split up into all the different feudal states. In the bourgeois transformation that had set in late in the 18th century, the Prussian state eventually

became the strongest and most evil and dangerous enemy of any democratic unification of Germany. And when, under the double pressure from economic needs and a threatening revolution from below, Prussia under Bismarck's leadership created the German national state, in blood and iron, and for all intents and purposes completed the bourgeois transformation, this limited bourgeois advance came combined with the preservation of the reactionary rule by the junkers, Prussia was not absorbed by Germany, but Germany was Prussianized. The upper hand was maintained by those reactionary forces of Prussianism that had turned antidemocratism within and aggression against the outside into a state doctrine.

This judgment on the ominous role of reactionary Prussianism in German history was elaborated in its basic features by the representatives of the revolutionary German workers movement, mainly by Marx, Engels and Mehring, and was further developed on the basis of new historic experiences through many different scientific studies in Marxist-Leninist historiography. The reactionary policies of the Prussian state, Prussianism in history and at the present, was, is and remains a subject matter of most intensive confrontation. In the course of the thus far greatest social transformation on German soil, the GDR has made a radical break from reactionary Prussianism.

By breaking the power of the junkers and monopoly capitalists, the GDR destroyed the social buttresses of Prussianism and Prussian-German militarism and thus paved the way for establishing a new, a socialist German fatherland. A central spot in this process was assigned to taking issue intellectually with reactionary Prussianism, which had proven the historic root of fascism. By destroying its social foundations, the socialist society also rid itself of the ominous social effects and traditions of Prussianism and thereby then also gained a new historic position from which the "other Prussia," the values and traditions created by the progressive classes in that state, can be tapped.

Prussian history, after all, is not confined to the work of the Hohenzollern dynasty and the aristocratic and junkers' class controlling that state. Those reactionary forces, while they decisively shaped the development of the Prussian state, they did not exclusively decide that development. It is also true of Prussia that the people's masses are making history because they ultimately constitute the decisive impulses for social progress and, as the producers and through their steady "quiet labor," create the material foundations for progress and, through their sociopolitical activities much as they may vary in the different phases of development, make the most important contribution to overcoming obsolete and enforcing new social conditions. The revolutionary activities of the people's masses ultimately, together with elemental economic needs, also forced the ruling classes of Prussia to accommodate themselves to historic progress in the transition from feudalism to capitalism.

The History of Prussia Also Has Its Progressive Traditions

GDR historiography has done a great deal in recent years to illuminate the progressive sides of Prussian history. Yet important research tasks remain to be solved in this direction. In this, GDR historiography can proceed from scientific insights by the founders of Marxism and by the leading representatives of the revolutionary German workers movement. Marx, Engels and Mehring have as long as they lived implacably opposed reactionary Prussianism and engaged in resolute struggle against all the pro-Prussian myths disseminated by bourgeois historiography. But they very accurately distinguished between this Prussianism and the social activities of the various classes in the Prussian state and thus never slighted or ignored the progressive tendencies and aspirations in Prussian history. They looked at Prussia with discrimination. They took account of the positive features the progressive classes had wrought. Nor were they oblivious of certain progress-promoting measures by some Prussian rulers. The classic authors of Marxism as much as Mehring recognized the historic place value of the Prussian reforms as a breakthrough achievement for making capitalist conditions prevail in Germany. To determine our own relationship, as a socialist German state, with Prussia's legacy we need not revise the image of Prussia as held by the revolutionary German workers movement, as bourgeois ideologues claim we have to. In our preserving and fostering the progressive traditions from Prussian history we also can pick up the insights of the leading representatives of the German proletariat.

Prussia was not only the state of the Hohenzollern and the country bumpkins, of militarism and aggression. Prussia also was the country of important peasant revolts late in the 18th century and in the 1848 revolution, the place of the liberal aristocratic reformers between 1807 and 1813, the part of Germany where the capitalist development went most rapidly and assumed the widest scope in the 19th century, and in the metropolis of which, in Berlin, the German bourgeois-democratic revolution reached what probably was its most important climax, on 18 March 1848. Here also it was where a strong workers class grew up which took up its independent struggle against semi-feudal Prussianism and the bourgeois exploiter system early in the game. The at times rapid and comprehensive development of Prussia in its economy, social structure and culture in the era of transition from feudalism to capitalism and, especially, in the time of the bourgeois transformation in the 19th century cannot be detached from the historic achievements of the working classes and strata, the peasants, petty bourgeois, the young working class, the progressive intelligentsia and, indeed, also the rising bourgeoisie.

During certain developmental phases and in certain areas, exploiter classes also contributed to Prussia's progress--as they did in all other class-antagonistic states as well. Marxist-Leninist historiography keeps its distance from idealizing the masses as much as frommoralistically denying progress potentials in exploiting classes. It objectively takes into account the antagonistic character of social progress under exploitative

conditions, the fact, that is, that under such conditions social progress to a large extent is brought about through exploitation. Not only the production organization and coordination but also the concentration and application of the surplus product as wrought from the working classes is among the functions of the exploiter classes.[3] Marxist-Leninist historiography here insists on the essential value criterion for how much the surplus product, though used throughout in the class interest of the exploiters, at the same time also is employed for the advance of progress. And finally it inquires into the "historic mission" of any given exploiter class seeking predominance in the class struggles to do away with the old and establish a new social order, that is, into whether and how much it exercises its responsibility as the leadership force for all classes in the new society.

As to the history of Prussia, this mainly involves the role of the Prussian bourgeoisie in the process of the bourgeois transformation of Germany. We have to inquire also, however, into the achievements by representatives of the Prussian nobility which, when the bourgeois society came to prevail, transformed itself into a capitalist junkers' class, in getting the bourgeois transformation started and completed. For there is no homogeneity within an exploiter class, it is diversified and composed of diverse fractions which also take different positions on the tasks of any given era. The Prussian nobility also produced various progressive representatives and had a liberal wing in the 19th century that advocated bourgeois, if moderate, progress. Finally we shall have to explore how the representatives of the nobility, notably the "crowned heads," in the Prussian state, applied the surplus product gained through exploitation, how much it served the advancement of progress or was used to block it.

The Janus Head of Absolutistic Prussia

A judgment on that for the age of absolutism will not be able to pass by the undeniable fact that Prussia's rulers used the means extorted from the people to insure their own class rule within and their active and aggressive foreign policy. Since Frederick Wilhelm I, roughly two-thirds of all state revenue were devoured by a gigantic standing army. Based on that, Frederick II conducted wars of conquest, annexed Silesia and engaged in the first division of Poland. That did not fail to have negative effects on the productive forces and the weak stratum of commercial and manufacturing capitalists then developing.

Under the conditions of the transitional era from feudalism to capitalism, securing late feudal class rule however also depended on the willingness by the princes or some progressive civil servants and aristocrats to accommodate themselves to the new trends in development. Prussia's rulers could not evade the effects of the era either. Up to 1640, when Elector Frederick Wilhelm came to the throne and the rise of Prussia began, there had only been one country in which the bourgeois revolution had won, the Netherlands. At the same time, with the start of the bourgeois revolution in England,

the emancipation struggle of the European bourgeoisie reached a new and higher level. When Frederick II died in 1786, the bourgeois transformation had already spread to the American continent, while France had come to the eve of its great bourgeois revolution which initiated the definitive triumph of capitalism in Europe. These transformations did not remain without effects on the feudal states, mainly because their internal structure was also beginning to change. Absolutism, coming to prevail then in many European states, ultimately was a form of accommodation to these new phenomena.

In Brandenburg-Prussia, leading representatives of the ruling class--even if for egoistical class interests--developed a relatively high willingness to accommodate. There, up to the last third of the 18th century it was greater than in many other German territorial states and ranged from imitating and restructuring progressive developments in more advanced states to adapting bourgeois ideologies to the backward feudal conditions all the way to the further development of the machinery of state. So Prussia's rulers got many suggestions for developing their government system, with respect to their commercial policy and army organization for instance, from the bourgeois Netherlands. This focus on the Netherlands was later supplemented by taking over experiences in the agricultural field from bourgeois England. The success of these efforts remained a limited one, to be sure, because Prussia's ruler would not touch the privileges of the nobility and would grant the bourgeoisie merely a narrow leeway for development.

In comparison with other West European states, Brandenburg-Prussia remained a backward country. Its population, mainly the feudally exploited peasants, lived in poverty and under the constant pressure from the landowners and the omnipotent machinery of state which would extort all and everything from them on behalf of the standing army. As the objective in the policy of accommodation never was the well-being of the people, the electors and kings did not care about social progress toward capitalist society either. Prussia's rulers engaged in dynastic power politics; they wanted to strenghten their state. For that purpose they took over experiences of the Netherlands, England and France.

Yet intention is not identical with effects in the history of the exploiter societies. The Hohenzollern, sure enough, reached their goal and in the course of the 18th century became the most powerful princes in the empire, along with the Habsburgs. Simultaneously, however, they inadvertently loosened existing structures of feudal coinage. The monarchy could not be strengthened economically without protecting the weak manufacturing bourgeoisie and without a minimum of cooperation.

The ability and willingness for accommodation were in the last analysis reflected by absolutism itself which, under the conditions of the transition to capitalism, insured the rule of the nobility. In spite of all its peculiarities, expressed in the enormous weight of the feudal landowners and in the

militarization of public life, one of the achievements of Prussian absolutism lay in the limited encouragement it gave to the productive forces. This includes principally the domestic colonizing stimulated by Prussian kings, mainly by Frederick II, the cultivation of fallow regions like the Oder basin or the construction of important canals. This expansion of the culture landscape goes to the credit of Prussian peasants and busy colonizers, some of whom had been expelled from other states for religious reasons. Under the prevailing conditions it could not have been carried out without the state playing an active role, i.e., without its financial resources, the work of experienced engineers and the employment of organizationally skilled civil servants.

Typical of Prussian absolutism was the development of the state machinery, by which the Prussian rulers consolidated their domestic rule, enforced their militarization of society--military modes of conduct were to a large extent carried into civilian life--, and shored up their aggressive foreign policy. The dialectics of history brought it about that thereby the state apparatus reached a high degree of centralization and "rationality" ever since the 1720's. Orderliness in finances and thrift now came to be the vogue at the Prussian court. Among the myths of Prussian historiography is that of the incorruptible, upright Prussian civil servant. Much could be objected to that. Nonetheless, there was still enough order and incorruptibility for the Prussian administration to serve as a model for the reforms by other absolute rulers and for the French apostles of enlightenment in the second half of the 18th century to derive a sense of reliability from it.

Noteworthy in Prussian absolutism furthermore was a certain encouragement for science and culture. "In fact, in its dealing with science one can discern the progressive face of the absolutistic Janus head," the GDR's noted Romance scholar Werner Krauss wrote about the European absolutistic states.[4] In Prussia, to be sure, this process had no continuity. Nor did it embrace the whole breadth of cultural development. Even so, science and culture gained a relatively wide margin, especially under kings Frederick I and Frederick II. In those years Prussia became an asylum for German or French men of the Enlightenment. On the initiative of Leibniz and under his direction the Prussian Academy of Sciences was established in 1700. In the further development of Berlin important monumental structures were created such as the opera Unter den Linden, designed by Knobelsdorff, and its forum. They, as much as the structures at Sanssouci belong among the architectural treasures that have come down to us from that period and for the restoration and maintenance of which the GDR government spends copious sums.

None of this abridges in any way the class character of Prussian absolutism. The bourgeois transformation, whatever the bourgeois historians may claim, did not start with the enlightened absolutism of a Frederick II. The reforms by the Prussian king inhered in his system. Nowhere did they cross the boundaries of feudal society, and they stopped precisely at the point where the interests of the feudal nobility would have been impinged. Rather, what was needed to initiate the bourgeois transformation in Prussia was the great French Revolution.

Prussia and the Bourgeois Transformation--Revolutionary or Reformist?

Prussia's position was ambiguous in this new world historic era. The Prussian state belonged among the most active reactionary powers trying everything possible for one and a half decades, by invasion attempts and counter-revolutionary wars against revolutionary France, to cancel the revolutionary bourgeois achievements in France gained by the 1789-1795 revolution. After 1815, Prussia, together with Austria and Russia, would form the international reactionary alliance, the "Holy Alliance," that would seek to nip in the bud any bourgeois-oppositional movement in Europe. In 1848/49 it was, along with Austria, the most powerful adversary of the bourgeois revolution in Germany.

The destruction of the Prussian state then was a condition for a democratic unification of Germany and, at once, a requirement for making bourgeois-democratic conditions prevail in Central Europe. "The Prussian state with all its setup, its tradition and its dynasty was exactly the only serious internal enemy the revolution in Germany had to overcome," is the judgment of Friedrich Engels. "Disbanding of the Prussian and disintegration of the Austrian state, true unification of Germany as a republic--there could be no other revolutionary program coming up for us."[5] The destruction of the Prussian state was the objective of all revolutionary forces in the 19th century. For this state, ruled by the junkers' class, not only provided the actual backing for the semifeudal reaction in all of Germany, but it became the main force itself seeking an antidemocratic solution of the tasks of the bourgeois transformation, the power center of a "revolution from the top."

Simultaneously, however, important positive impulses for bourgeois progress in Germany sprang from the revolutionary activities of the peasants, plebeians and workers, from the work of liberal Prussian aristocrats, and from oppositional efforts in the Prussian bourgeoisie. The effects of the French Revolution and the revolutionary wars, most clearly revealed in the striking defeat of the old Prussian state at Jena and Auerstedt, and the simultaneous pressure by antifeudal movements in Prussia, while they were not sufficient for overthrowing the reactionary junkers' class and setting the bourgeois society in Prussia on its revolutionary course, did yet create enough sociopolitical leeway for liberal aristocrats since 1807 to pave the way to the bourgeois system through reforms. Even if these reforms were kept within bounds as determined by the junkers' interests and still further restricted since 1815, progress, through the initiation of the bourgeois transformation in Prussia, still assumed national dimension and radiation. While the Prussian reforms did not reach the degree of the transformation brought about in the West German areas more strongly affected by the French Revolution, they were still more decisive and comprehensive than in many other German territorial states.

It explains why bourgeois patriots looked to Prussia then and thought they saw a center of progress in it and why Prussia, in the struggle against the foreign rule under Napoleon, became a center of national resistance

and could play a historically positive role during the war of liberation in 1813. Thanks to the activities by the popular masses, released and encouraged by the reforms, the war of liberation assumed features of a people's liberation struggle. GDR historiography has already done a great deal in the early 1950's, mainly in connection with the 140th anniversary of the war of liberation, in scientifically elaborating and creating awareness of the progressive traditions of the Prussian reform period. The stimulating television film about Scharnhorst has recently picked up those efforts. Historical science and propaganda ought to pay tribute in the future, above and beyond the merits of the military reformers, to the achievments of the reformers in other areas of social development as well.

Also in the struggle against the political restoration of aristocratic rule after 1815 and in the time of the preparation and implementation of the bourgeois-democratic 1848/49 revolution, progressive class forces in Prussia played an important role. Not until the Prussian bourgeoisie headed the feudal opposition in 1840, it assumed a national scope, and a development was initiated that led to the 1848 revolution. Its resistance against the Prussian government at the first united Landtag in 1847 formed the climax in the political-progressive struggle by that class for extending the bourgeois transformation. This was the most important example of the German bourgeoisie's actively assuming its hegemony. All the more apparent then was the betrayal by the Prussian bourgeoisie during the 1848 revolution, when it surrendered its claim to power out of fear of the people and the independently acting workers class.

The class struggles in Prussia were of a decision-making character throughout the revolution. On the one hand, what happened in Berlin on 18 March 1848 smashed the omnipotence of reaction in Germany. On the other hand, the defeat of the revolutionary forces in their struggle against the coup d'etat of the crown in November 1848 ushered in the decisive counterrevolutionary reversal in Germany. In the 1860's Prussia became an important center in the struggle between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces for ending the bourgeois revolution in Germany. Along with more immediate economic needs, the revolutionary mass movements were what forced the Prussian junkers to enforce the most important demands of the 1848/49 revolution, even though in their own specific manner, by a "revolution from the top." In the final phase of the bourgeois transformation, the work of the doubtless most far-sighted representative of the junkers' class, Otto von Bismarck, whom Friedrich Engels called a "royal Prussian revolutionary,"[6] had progressive consequences, even though strongly confined by the interests of the junkers' class.

To the extent that Prussia, in consequence of the industrial revolution, became the economically strongest and most important German state, having important industrial centers of Germany at its disposal in the Rhineland, Silesia and Berlin, it also became the main field for the German workers class to constitute itself economically, socially and politically. The weavers' rebellion in Prussian Silesia in 1844 sparked the active movement

of the German proletariat. Rhenish Prussia became a chief bastion of the first Marxist party, the Communist League, in Germany. The Rhenish metropolis on 3 March 1848 experienced the first independent political action taken by German workers, initiated by the communists, during the 1848 revolution. Cologne in 1848/49 became the headquarters of the communist vanguard. There, the first independent newspaper of the German proletariat, the NEUE RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG, was published. Berlin and other Prussian cities became centers of the first large strike movement of German workers in the spring of 1848. In the Rhine Province as well as in Berlin, members of the Communist League secured the revolutionary continuity throughout the period of reaction and had a significant share in the new upswing of the workers movement in the 1860's. The Universal German Working Men's Association, founded in 1863, had its most important bases in Prussia. In Berlin, Magdeburg and several Prussian cities on the Rhine, the first organized groups of adherents to the International Workers Association sprang up in the mid-1860's. In the struggle against Bismarck's Anti-Socialist Laws, the Prussian regions, because of the strength of the workers class there and its direct confrontation with Prussianism, became centers for the development of the revolutionary German workers movement.

The German Bourgeoisie--Heir to Reactionary Prussianism

The unification of the empire in 1871 became a decisive caesura in the history of Prussia and of the German people. This event was contradictory in character. Doing away with the splintering of Germany and forming a bourgeois German national state meant significant social progress. Because a united German state conformed to the needs of capitalist development. It facilitated a rapid development of the capitalist mode of production and of the modern industrial proletariat and finally offered the socialist workers movement new opportunities for forming on a national basis. It was in this sense that Marx wrote to Engels in 1870: "If the Prussians win, then the centralization of state power [will be] useful for the centralization of the German workers class."[7] At the same time, the founding of the Reich was a victory for Prussian reaction. The German bourgeoisie carries part of the blame and a special responsibility for it. Once again, afraid of a democratic popular movement, it had betrayed its own historic class tasks and formed an antidemocratic reactionary class alliance with Prussian junkerdom, in which the latter exercised the predominant political influence. This enabled the bourgeoisie to conserve and preserve arch-reactionary Prussianism far into the 20th century, becoming one of the pillars of Prussian-German militarism.

The 1871 unification of the empire fastened together the unification with Prussianism and militarism. It provided Prussia with supremacy in the German Empire, securing that supremacy by the especially reactionary class and government structure of that state which would then essentially determine the policies of the German Empire. The historically fateful relationship between Prussia and the empire was the result of capitalism's counterrevolutionary prevailing over the militaristic founding of the empire and therefore also remained a fundamental social problem--as long as the empire

and Prussia existed. "The German Reich," Friedrich Engels wrote in 1886, looking into the far distant future, "is placed in vital danger by its Prussian foundation."[8] Prussia's supremacy in the empire led to the further expansion of militarism. The military apparatus and its administrative and planning organs remained almost completely outside any parliamentary control. In terms of its class structure borne mainly by junkerdom and parts of the haute bourgeoisie, and pervaded by specifically Prussian caste prejudice, this forceful militarization, for antidemocratic motives in domestic policy and aggressive motives in foreign policy, for all intents and purposes became the "state's main purpose."[9] The military apparatus and its executive organs were given crucial political weight in deciding all domestic and foreign policy questions.

After the unification of the empire in 1871, Prussia had lost the last function still connecting it with social progress in Germany. Now it became a bastion of reaction all the way through. The systematic Prussianization of Germany began. As the Prussian prime minister and its chancellor at one and the same time, Bismarck started an extensive campaign against the Social-Democratic workers movement in this newly founded Prussian-German empire and for 12 years kept the notorious Anti-Socialist Laws alive. The Prussian militarists engaged in a systematic mobilization of the German army and started building a navy with which to threaten England. By having stolen Alsace and Lorraine, Germany had already made a permanent enemy of France.

German imperialism, developing since the turn of the century, which had arrived too late when the world was divided up and which, to quote Lenin, was essentially bourgeois junkerdom imperialism, found its most important tool in Prussian militarism and the most obedient executors of its rapacious policy in the Prussian ministerial bureaucracy, which eventually led to the catastrophe of World War I. The November Revolution in Germany, breaking out under the influence of the Great Socialist October Revolution, did weaken the positions of Prussian reaction but did not render it impotent. The Rhenish-Westphalian heavy industrialists and the junkers east of the Elbe, embodying reactionary Prussianism in the 20th century, conducted the counterrevolution and the fascist "seizure of power." It was patently symbolic that the Prussian General Field Marshal and German Reichspraesident Paul von Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler chancellor and, in March 1933, demonstratively stood at his side in the garrison church of Potsdam in front of the sarcophagus of Frederick II.

Not until World War II was lost, which had, on behalf of German monopoly capital, been unleashed by the fascists and had been conducted by generals reared in the Prussian tradition, some Prussian conservatives recalled the Tauroggen Convention and Bismarck's warnings never to let a conflict with Russia arise. Some of them took part in the antifascist resistance struggle and found their way to the Free Germany National Committee. The influence of Prussian reaction had proven so fateful however that the victorious allied powers officially dissolved the Land of Prussia by a control council

decision in 1947. Dissolving the Prussian state was a necessary historic act and conformed with the centuries-old historic experiences the German people and other European peoples had had with militarism and reactionary Prussianism. Yet the actual destruction of reactionary Prussianism could come only through the progressive forces of the people itself under working class leadership. With the revolutionary elimination of imperialism on GDR soil, the economic, social and political roots of Prussianism likewise were destroyed.

The Marxist-Leninist picture of Prussia has clear and sharp contours. It is based on the realization that Prussian history too is governed by the dialectics between two class lines. It avoids all one-sidedness and absolute terms and unmistakably brings out the reactionary features inseparable from the development of that state entity. At the same time, however, it also includes all those historically grown values, the positive values that come from the efforts of progressive classes--even in as reactionary a state as Prussia, and those are the ones that our discriminating understanding of our inheritance accepts, preserves and fosters as our traditions. The ideological class struggle against present-day imperialism calls for a confrontation, on principle, with all manifestations of reactionary Prussianism which find their continuation under the imperialist conditions in the FRG. The development of socialist society in the GDR, where the social roots of Prussianism have been eliminated, demands however that we tap all positive and progressive achievements and traditions also found in Prussian history and integrate them with our own store of traditions.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Appeal for the 30th Anniversary of the Founding of the GDR," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 18 November 1977, p 1.

2. "Prussia Without Myths," Hamburg, 1978.

3. Cf. Rolf Barthel, "Class Contradiction and Historical Advances," "Probleme der geschichtswissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis" (Problems in Historical Science Knowledge), Akademie publishing house, Berlin, 1977, pp 115 ff.

4. "Studien zur deutschen und franzoesischen Aufklaerung" (Studies on German and French Enlightenment), Ruetten & Loening, Berlin, 1963, p 43.

5. Friedrich Engels, "Marx and the NEUE RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG, 1848-1849," Marx/Engels, "Werke" (Works), Vol 21, Dietz publishing house, Berlin, 1962, p 20.

6. Friedrich Engels, "The Role of Violence in History," ibid., p 438.

7. Marx to Engels in Manchester, 20 July 1870, Marx/Engels, "Werke," Vol 33, Dietz publishing house, Berlin, 1962, p 5.

8. Engels to August Bebel at Borsdorf near Leipzig, 13 September 1886, Marx/Engels, "Werke," Vol 36, Dietz publishing house, Berlin, 1967, p 524.

9. Friedrich Engels, "Anti-Duehring," Marx/Engels, "Werke," Vol 20, Dietz publishing house, Berlin, 1962, p 158.

'Prussia's Image' for Workers Class

East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 20-21 Sep 80 p 9

['Reflections for the Weekend' column by Ottomar Harbauer: "Prussia, History, We and Others"]

[Text] Prussia--that word arouses ambiguous feelings, surely.

By Law number 46 of the Allied Control Council for Germany, of 25 February 1947, that Land was officially dissolved. Properly called there the "cradle of militarism," it had perished as the heartland of the "Thousand Year Reich" and together with it.

It has nothing certainly to do with apolitical nostalgia if in the state west of our border, which wishes that so much should continue to exist that has long been dead, new myths about Prussia are invented and added to the old ones. After everything that has happened in German history, no one may be indifferent to which image of Prussia it is that is publicly being sold there, and for whose benefit. And especially it does not leave us unruffled if one intends to attribute to the GDR a view on Prussia, for transparent political reasons, that is far removed from reality.

The revolutionary German workers movement has always had a vivid interest in the past, and not only in that of its own class. It advanced while taking critical issue with history and constantly absorbing progressive and humanistic ideas of the past. Reactionary chatterers often have accused the GDR of having a ruptured relationship with, or even escaping from, German history. A dumber claim than that has never been made. Deeply rooted in this history itself, tied up with it through thousands of spiritual threads, the GDR at once faces up to the totality of our historical inheritance. Prussia is part of our past.

Marx and Engels, Mehring and Karl Liebknecht handed down to us a cogent characterization of reactionary Prussianism. Implacably they fought against militarism, which infested all life in the Prussian state like weeds, sought to choke any democratic sentiment within, and attacked other peoples by its aggressions. The Prussian sense of submissiveness (which would later be held up to ridicule in a masterly fashion by Heinrich Mann), the nobility's overbearing sense of dignity of rank and its arrogant intellectual stupidity were the targets of their acerbic mockery. At the same time, however, they never disregarded the progressive elements in Prussian history.

The image of Prussia held by the German workers class thus has long had clearly delineated contours. No cause for revising it exists.

If we today can discern still more lines within these contours and lights and shadows protrude more prominently, it certainly has something to do with the fact that our country after 1945 took thorough critical issue with reactionary Prussianism and eradicated its social and political roots. It became possible to take a calmer view on that period of German history. Our image of Prussia became more differentiated.

Prussian history of course includes also the achievements and political actions taken by the people, the liberal bourgeoisie, the noted reformers and the patriots among the military leaders. Famous sculptors and architects worked in Prussia, without whom there would be no Sans Souci and no Linden Forum, and important poets and painters. And without the great scientific achievements of that time, our people's intellectual reservoir would be much poorer. Prussia, after all, also was the center of modern industrial development, and that means of the revolutionary German workers movement.

We look at history as it has been, in all its dialectics, i.e., its contradictoriness, with "good" and "evil" existing in juxtaposition. This discriminating view also applies to the ruling classes and their representatives, even though we certainly have no desire to "turn" Prussian kings into heroes of progress.

But this is the way it is: Based on our condemnation, in principle, of reactionary Prussianism, we also critically investigate that period of our history and, in doing so, discover quite a lot that can satisfy the legitimate working class claim to preserving our historic legacy and be absorbed in our socialist state's store of traditions. That will then also be withheld from being misused for nationalistic purposes.

If that galls them on the Rhine--we could not care less.

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IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL, LOCAL PATRIOTISM EXPLAINED

GDR Citizens: Patriots, Internationalists

East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 26-27 Jan 80 p 9

['Blickpunkt' (Focal Point) feature article by Dr Guenter Kertzscher: "We Really Have Our Fatherland--Reflections After the 11th SED Central Committee Session." For references to other discussions of the subject see translation of an East Berlin EINHEIT July-August 1980 article published under the heading, "Need for Intensified 'Homeland History' Study Discussed," in JPRS 76481, 24 Sep 80, No 1815 of this series, pp 103-111]

[Text] When I talk of the "territory" of the GDR, I am using a concept that can be handled most soberly. I refer to a piece of the global surface of our planet, defined by a marked national border and with appropriate aspects in terms of geography and international law. If I talk about "fatherland," I am using a word to which there is more than merely a concept. It--like the moon at hazy days--is surrounded by an aura made up of sentiments, experiences, historical memories, attractive or repulsive, never leaving you indifferent. You must listen to the sound of the word, whether it is big and full or tinny and hollow.

In Hoelderlin's poems, "fatherland" has a lofty sound, and also in Schiller's language: "Your fatherland, so dear, that you must join, and hold it firmly with all your heart, there are the mighty roots of all your strength." Hollow and suspicious the word sounds in "Deutsche Kriegslieder" (German War songs), published in 1914. Actually it is not a matter of the poets' linguistic gift, for there were noted people among their authors. It depends on the historic circumstances which stand clearly before our eyes: Under the slogan that the peoples had to defend their fatherland they were driven into imperialist war--and not only the German people. In our language, the word "fatherland" has long not been able to recover from that abuse. Not until the GDR was founded, under entirely new circumstances, we use it with good conscience and without holds barred.

Homeland Sentiment and Patriotism

In the "Communist Manifesto," Marx and Engels put it like this: "The workers have no fatherland." That is a point of polemics. It addresses the accusation that the communists wanted to abolish the fatherland. And then the text continues: "We cannot take from them what they don't possess. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself as the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word." This somewhat qualifies the apodictic statement that the workers have no fatherland. One could put it like this: They do not have it. That means they live in it but do not possess it. It is owned by the exploiters. The exploited are treated poorly in this fatherland. In that sense they do not have one.

But they do have a homeland which they certainly love no less than do the ruling classes in capitalist society. Love for the homeland is the centerpiece of patriotism.

In the Weimar Republic period, in 1929, Kurt Tucholsky published a book with the ironic title "Deutschland, Deutschland ueber alles" (Germany, Germany Above Everything). It is full of mordant criticism of that society, of those circumstances that would give rise to fascism and war. But its last chapter deals with the love for the homeland. The author writes about "his" country: "It begins in Central Germany, where the air is so clear above the roofs, and the more northward you go, the louder beats your heart, until you sense the sea. The sea--. As already for kilometers before, every pole and every thatched roof suddenly gains a deeper importance . . . here we stand only, they tell us, because right behind us is the sea--and the sea is what we are there for. Wind-blown is the shrubbery, on fine sand you gnash your teeth . . ."

The whole section is an affecting expression of patriotism. The author might have rejected that word, and this quite properly so because he does not include the state and society in it. Those he hates. And still he does not want to give up his fatherland: "And just as the national associations are drumming across the roads--with the same right, the very identical right, we, having been born here, and writing and speaking a better German than most of the national asses--with precisely the same right we claim the river and the forest, the beach and the house, the clearing and the meadow: our land it is."

Abuse of the Word Fatherland

In that sense the workers too have always had a fatherland: their land, their language, their local dialect, the humanistic culture of their people. And politically? Not the ruling bourgeois state could be their fatherland, but the tradition of their revolutionary struggle was already part of it. After all, as Marx and Engels put it, they struggled to

"constitute themselves as the nation." Thus their fatherland to them, to quote what Lenin said later, is the "given political, cultural, social milieu" of the class struggle. The revolutionary proletariat could not be indifferent to the conditions for its struggle. Just because at no time the fatherland was an indifferent matter, the imperialist bourgeoisie was able to misuse the ties of all the working people with their fatherland.

Against this abuse Lenin fought rigorously during World War I. "There is no other way to 'defend one's fatherland' in Europe in the 20th century," he wrote, "but by fighting with all revolutionary means against the monarchy and the landowners and capitalists in one's own fatherland, i.e., against the worst enemies in one's homeland."

It was a matter of turning the imperialist war, mendaciously ballyhooed as the defense of the fatherland, into a struggle for liberating the fatherland from imperialism. In 1918 Lenin called for the defense of the fatherland. The October Revolution had then taken place. Now the Russian workers defended their fatherland, for now they had a fatherland in the true sense of the word.

We too today have a fatherland in the full sense, the GDR. It is our land between Cape Arkona and the Fichtel Gebirge. Socialist conditions see to its being a true fatherland without any restraints. We are working together and for ourselves. We have achieved something, have experienced something in common, and are jointly planning our future. It gives rise to the sense of of "we" that connects us. For the 30th anniversary of our republic, we paid tribute to our common path, the achievements we have accomplished, the battles we have won. It was a holiday at which, as Erich Honecker said in his report to the 11th Central Committee session, the GDR citizens demonstrated "their deep love for their socialist fatherland."

The fatherland provides safety as well as space for our developing capacities and capabilities. It offers security and protection. The well-being of men, the happiness of the people, that is the meaning of socialism. That is our country's supreme precept.

We Are Prepared to Defend It

A fatherland lives through its citizens. The result of labor determines the standard of living. Among us, in socialism, both sides are closely and directly connected with each other. Not only labor is wanted but also a sense of responsibility, stock-taking, initiative. We are all for our fatherland. We are ready to defend it any old day whenever anyone comes to defame or insult our fatherland. Our allegiance to our socialist fatherland is an essential element of what we mean by human dignity.

The love for our fatherland does not blind us to everything else. We are no chauvinists. We appreciate what other peoples have achieved and are achieving. We have respect for their peculiarities. We feel part of the

family of socialist states and know of our commitment to that community. Our policy is borne by a sense of coresponsibility for peace all over the world. Thus we are patriots and internationalists at once.

LDPD on Promotion of Patriotism

East Berlin DER MORGEN in German 11 Jun 80 p 3

[Excerpts of speech by Gerhard Lindner, member, Political Committee; secretary, Central Executive Committee, Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (LDPD); given at recent Political Committee meeting in House of Ministries, East Berlin: "Homeland Sentiment and Action." A translation of a July 1978 article defining the GDR's historical traditions, published by the party's monthly organ, see JPRS 71785, 31 Aug 78, No 1582 of this series, pp 3-5]

[Text] The LDPD members in the residential areas concentrate their commitment on the shaping of universally interested personalities for whom patriotism, homeland sentiment and national consciousness, social activity and a sense of community are important and indispensable values in life. With constituting the socialist nation in the GDR, the promotion of patriotism, of consciously feeling at home, and the deliberate presentation of the various elements that document our national identity play an ever increasing role in our theoretical thought and our cultural life in practice.

The citizens' identification with their state, their town, their residential area keeps reasserting itself as an important social impulse for the will for achievement and for being interested in all territorial problems. If love for one's immediate home area and the pride in what one has achieved oneself combine with a view at the historic lines of development and with respect for the national identity of other peoples, patriotism will produce those patriotic and internationalist values that are commensurate with the ideals of the workers class.

Homeland sentiment thus is an essential motive, object and subject of activity in cultural policy. That is served first of all by animating our intellectual-cultural life in the whole breadth of the culture concept in the residential areas. It is served by all those relevant intellectual concerns, all the cultural offerings, all the sports activities which make the citizen find out the residential area offers the place and space for his personality development, allowing him to develop and satisfy his needs.

And then, the development of homeland sentiment is served by a whole number of specific forms of cultural work and activity which have become more prominent in recent years and the encouragement of which also calls for our party's participation. We refer to the appropriation, cultivation and further development of traditions and of our cultural legacy in its whole breadth, the preservation, fostering and further development of customs and habits and territorial peculiarities, of folklore and natural and local history, the memorials, the care for the eye-witnesses of human capabilities and much else besides.

Many party friends in all bezirk associations have committed themselves to this task at work and at leisure time. Broad is the palette of our party friends' participation in the preparation for the folklore festival within the 18th workers festival to be held this month in Stralsund. Our party friends are working with dedication within the circles of our friends in the newly founded societies of the GDR Culture League, such as the society for memorial sites, the society for local history and the society for nature and environment.

In regarding the residential area as an essential place for personality development and for shaping the socialist way of life, which is intimately connected with the sphere of work and the sphere of individual life, it becomes clear that the forming of the socialist way of life here too connects with doing away with old habits of thinking and living, and with confronting late bourgeois models of behavior.

The socialist way of life does not form by itself and certainly not without turning back all attempts at ideological diversion by our imperialist enemy. It therefore is necessary, throughout the creative process that forms the socialist way of life, to deal with basic issues, to give oneself an accounting of what has been achieved, and constantly to consolidate one's political-ideological standpoint again in the struggles of our times. That also is why we regard our party events as an indispensable part of our intellectual life in the residential areas.

All who work in the residential areas must give further thought to two things: (1) How can we fully tap available reserves and, through new ideas and initiatives, and by involving additional forces, further extend the advances made in the National Front community; and (2) what are the new demands and possibilities resulting from the rapidly proceeding changes in our socialist reality.

Higher intensity and increased labor efficiency is the most important source of culture in socialism, as our cultural level, in turn, is an important source for improved labor efficiency.

At the end of the speech, the tasks for the LDPD executive committees in promoting cultural-intellectual life in the residential areas were summarized under five points. They include a penetrating clarification of the fundamental cultural aspects of party events resulting from social development, the promotion among all party friends of the desire for culture, the constructive political-ideological work in each basic unit and its influence on the cooperation within the National Front, as well as the active participation by the Liberal Democrats in all tasks in the residential areas.

5885
CSO: 2300

AUSTRIAN GENERAL INTERVIEWED ON MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF STRIKES

DW110856 Bonn DIE WELT in German 9 Sep 80 p 5

[Interview of Gen Wilhelm Kuntner, commanding officer of the Austrian army's leadership academy by Carl Gustav Stroehm, date and place of interview not given]

[Text] There are many indications that Poland has not calmed down yet by a shot. And the tones from Moscow grow sharper. The "brotherhood-in-arms" fall military exercises of the Warsaw Pact have been in progress since yesterday. Reminiscences of Prague come alive. How alarming is the situation? This is the topic on which DIE WELT interviewed Austrian General Wilhelm Kuntner.

WELT: General, do you still consider the Polish army a reliable ally of Moscow and of the Warsaw Pact after the latest strikes and revolts in Poland?

Kuntner: ARMEE RUNDSCHAU, the journal of the GDR People's Army, wrote in July this year: "Today the Polish Army is considered a modern coalition force within the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. The PZPR--with which 85 percent of the officers, every other professional noncommissioned officer, and 23 percent of the soldiers are affiliated--consistently insures a constantly closer concerted action especially with the Soviet Army, the National People's Army and the Czechoslovak People's Army."

This is a quotation from a journal of the Warsaw Pact shortly before the outbreak of the strike. Perhaps we ought to phrase the question thusly: To what extent is the PZPR still a solidly structured, integrated instrument among the East Bloc's Communist parties?

Parallels exist here with the events of 1968: but with a converse effect. In Czechoslovakia it was the new leadership elite of the communist party which had set its sights on, say, a friendlier communist social system and immediately was accepted by the party have been enforced by means of pressure from below. The future will tell whether the Polish Communist Party with its present leadership is credible to the leading Soviet power or whether a change will start this Polish party, albeit not in the direction of further concessions, but in the direction of a hardening of the situation.

WELT: So you do not see any chance for further concessions from the party to the people?

Kuntner: The limits of these concessions do not depend so much on the Polish party leadership as on the interests of the leading power of the Warsaw Pact, that is, the Soviet Union. The tones we are hearing from Moscow these days are not a good omen. However, it will depend on Moscow as to whether something can emerge in the Warsaw Pact which so far has been unprecedented.

Every West European should be gratified if this happens--yet every thinking person ought to ask himself soberly whether anything like what has now happened in Poland is possible at all in a communist country and in a communist alliance.

WELT: Suppose the development takes a negative turn, how would you assess the combat potential of the Polish Army? Do you believe that this army--as threatened already by the Polish army paper a few days back--would allow itself to be used internally in a conflict similar to civil war?

Kuntner: Since I know Poland and the Poles I venture to doubt that an army like the Polish army with its total of 300,000 men could be used against its own people, despite the fact that many communists are in that army. This may be different in the case of the 70,000 men of the security forces, including the border troops, which are under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. But then, the orders of magnitude are different: those who went on strike numbered many hundred thousand men and they now have certain expectations--they are perhaps in a sort of euphoria. If these expectations are not fulfilled, we have to fear indeed that internal conflicts will be inevitable--especially if the Polish working people are too greatly disappointed.

I believe that what matters to this Polish workers' movement is not so much an improvement in the economic conditions, but having a chance to live as central Europeans: with the basic rights of freedom, without censorship, and in a society in which man is not just an instrument of the party bureaucracy but really can be a human being.

WELT: Do you consider a Soviet military intervention to be feasible, possible--or ruled out?

Kuntner: Something that has happened once before cannot be ruled out. I believe that the Soviets will try very hard to keep their own armed forces from becoming involved in an internal conflict of a Warsaw Pact state, particularly now, shortly before the Madrid CSCE followup conference slated to begin in November in Madrid. But, on the other hand, it is absolutely clear to me that when the collective security of the Warsaw Pact states is involved, as Moscow interprets it, the Kremlin will not shy away from an armed intervention in Poland as a last resort.

WELT: What size military force would something like that require? Would the troops of the pact maneuvers "brotherhood-in-arms 80" suffice, the troops that are being concentrated now close to the Polish border on GDR territory?

Kuntner: The maneuvers taking place now in the GDR were announced a few days prior to the Polish strikes. A total of 40,000 men are involved. That would be too few for an intervention. Moreover, the Soviet Union has stationed 20 divisions in the GDR alone, in Poland there are two-to-three Soviet divisions,

and another 30 divisions are stationed in the European part of Russia, that is East of Poland. Alerting these units or marching them off is certainly not a problem for a big military power. I see no connection now between the Warsaw Pact maneuvers and developments in Poland.

WELT: Could you imagine a military collision between the Polish and the Russian armies?

Kuntner: In the Czechoslovak crisis, that is in 1968, many people were surprised that the CSSR army did not resist the Soviet invasion at all. We know today that this army was trained for more than two decades that the enemy and invader would come from the West. It seemed impossible to turn the Czechoslovak Army around in a few hours, saying that invaders were coming from a completely different side, namely from the East.

That would be different in Poland due to a long tradition, and maybe also due to the fact that Poland does not have a border with NATO. The Poles have a different awareness with regard to their state and people than the Czechoslovaks. Soviet military planning, therefore, would have to take into consideration, in contrast to 1968, that the Polish Army might not side with the Warsaw Pact everywhere, and that at least parts of the Polish Armed Forces could side with the Polish people and the workers, just as in Hungary in 1956.

WELT: How many troops would the Soviets have to use militarily in order to carry out a successful intervention in Poland?

Kuntner: Well, that depends on the assessment of the Polish Army, but if the Soviets want to exert control over Poland very quickly--just to create a fait accompli vis-a-vis the world public--they would have to set up at least 20 divisions in the East as well as in the West so as to starve out the reoccurrence of such movements as in Gdansk.

WELT: How long do you think it would take to make preparations for such an enterprise vis-a-vis Poland?

Kuntner: The preparations for the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 lasted for many weeks, but at that time it went parallel with several Soviet attempts to solve the problem politically. Purely militarily--that is, without the attempt to achieve a political solution--the Soviets would need 1 week for the concentration of troops in the case of Poland. But we would spot that in time.

WELT: Could it happen to Western politicians and military men that they might wake up some day unsuspectingly while the Soviets have invaded Warsaw?

Kuntner: No. Particularly, since the Soviet Armed Forces in the GDR have all been deployed with a view to the West--and in order to turn them around in the direction of Poland, some reorganization would naturally be necessary, which one would most accurately observe in the West with today's electronic means.

WELT: Is it not so that regardless of how the Polish movement may develop in the future, the strategic situation in Europe must change due to this development?

Kuntner: Particularly the political landscape will change. If the reform movement continues, the whole East Bloc will change in the long run, because developments cannot be limited to Poland. But if there is an intervention, detente will lose face and significance completely. One cannot apply force internally while saying externally that detente exists.

We in the West knew about the limits of the process of detente. We started out from the assumption that there were common interests among Europeans despite the differences in political and economic systems. But if the application of force is necessary, we ought to strike the word detente from our vocabulary.

CSO: 2300

AIR ROUTES, AIRPORTS FOR CIVIL AVIATION DESIGNATED BY DECREE

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 77, 25 Sep 80 pp 2-4

[Decree of the Council of State for the establishment of air routes, airports and aerodromes assigned to civil aviation]

[Text] The Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article 1. - The air routes assigned to civil aviation for international and domestic air transport, as well as for purely domestic air transport, are those outlined in Annex No 1.

The width of air routes is:

a) 20 km (10 km to the left and right of the line of flight) for international air routes;

b) 10 km (5 km to the left and right of the line of flight) for domestic air routes.

The designation of air routes and the minimum flight levels for them will be established by the Department of Civil Aviation and will be published in the radio-navigation map of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

The maximum flight level for air routes is 14,950 standard meters.

Article 2. - The airports and aerodromes assigned to civil aviation, as well as their zones, are those outlined in Annex No 2.

The vertical limits of airport zones will be established by the Department of Civil Aviation and will be published in the approach maps drawn up for each airport.

For take-offs and landings, those aircraft that fly utility missions and for sport will use the airports and aerodromes outlined in the Annex, as well as the airfields established according to legal provisions. The airfield zones will have a maximum lateral limit of 20 km from the center of the field and the vertical limit will be a maximum of 200 meters above the ground and obstacles on it.

Article 3. - Annexes No 1 and No 2 are an integral part of this decree.

Article 4. - Articles 6-9, 13 and the annex "The Airports and Aerodromes Assigned to Civil Aviation, as well as Their Zones" in the Flight Rules in the Air Space of the Socialist Republic of Romania, approved in Council of Ministers Decision No 793/1974, published in BULETINUL OFICIAL of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Part I No 98, 11 July 1974, as it was amended and modified in Council of Ministers Decision No 65/1978, is hereby abrogated.

[Signed] Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania
Bucharest, 23 September 1980, No 287.

Annex No 1

Air Routes Assigned to Civil Aviation

A. For international and domestic air transport:

1. Border crossing point with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (48°03'N - 23°19'E) - Baia Mare - Tirgu Mures - Brasov - Mizil.

2. Border crossing point with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (45°28'N - 28°14'E) - Galati - Urziceni - Floresti - border crossing point with the Bulgarian People's Republic (43°42'N - 24°51'E).

3. From the Black Sea (43°56'N - 29°10'E) - Constanta - Galati - Brasov.

4. From the Black Sea (43°42'N - 28°48'E) - Constanta - Tandarei - Urziceni - Strejnic - Curtea de Arges - Deva - Arad - border crossing point with the People's Republic of Hungary (46°18'N - 21°10'E).

5. Border crossing point with the People's Republic of Bulgaria (43°45'N - 29°49'E) - Tirgu Jiu - Arad.

6. Border crossing point with the People's Republic of Bulgaria (43°48'N - 23°43'E) - Tirgu Jiu.

7. Border crossing point with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (44°46'N - 21°34'E) - Tirgu Jiu - Floresti - Mizil - Galati.

8. Border crossing point with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (45°16'13"N - 21°16'43"E) - Timisoara - Arad.

9. Border crossing point with the People's Republic of Hungary (47°00'N - 21°41'E) - Oradea - Sibiu - Strejnic.

10. Oradea - Cluj-Napoca - Sibiu - Brasov - Strejnic.

11. Baia Mare - Cluj-Napoca - Tirgu Mures.

12. Floresti - Curtea de Arges.

13. Curtea de Arges - Sibiu - Deva.

14. Timisoara - Deva.

B. For domestic air transport:

1. Urziceni - Tulcea.

2. Constanta - Tulcea - Galati - Bacau - Suceava.

3. Galati - Iasi - Suceava.

4. Mizil - Bacau - Iasi.

5. Floresti - Craiova - Tirgu Jiu - Caransebes - Timisoara.

6. Arad - Oradea - Satu Mare - Baia Mare.

7. Oradea - Deva.

8. Satu Mare - Cluj-Napoca - Deva.

9. Tirgu Mures - Suceava.

10. Bacau - Tirgu Mures - Sibiu.

[Annex No 2 on next page]

Annex No 2

Airports and Aerodromes Assigned to Civil Aviation, as well as Their Zones

Airport (Aerodrome)	Airport (Aerodrome) Zone	
	Lateral Limit from the Center of the Airport (Aerodrome)	Vertical Limit from the Ground - in meters -
1	2	3
A. Airports Open to Domestic and International Air Traffic		
Arad/Arad	Segment of a circle extending 20 km, limited by the border with the People's Republic of Hungary and the coordinates: 46°02'00"N - 21°06'30"E and 46°02'00"N - 21°25'30"e	Limit set by the Department of Civil Aviation
Bucharest/Baneasa	An irregular area, with the farthest side 22 km away	
Bucharest/Otopeni	Segment of a circle extending 25 km	
Constanta/M. Kogalniceanu	A circle extending 30 km	
Tirgu Mures/Vidrasau	A circle extending 20 km	
Timisoara/Giarmata	A circle extending 25 km	
B. Airports Open to Domestic Air Traffic		
Bacau/Bacau	A circle extending 20 km	Limit set by the Department of Civil Aviation
Baia Mare/Tautii-Magheraus	A circle extending 20 km	
Caransebes	A circle extending 30 km	
Cluj-Napoca/Someseni	A circle extending 30 km	
Craiova/Craiova	A circle extending 20 km	
Iasi/Iasi	Segment of a circle extending 20 km, limited by the border with the USSR	

1	2	3
Oradea/Oradea	Segment of a circle extending 20 km, limited by the border with the People's Republic of Hungary	
Satu Mare/Satu Mare	Segment of a circle extending 20 km, limited by the border with the People's Republic of Hungary	
Sibiu/Turnisor	A circle extending 30 km	
Suceava/Salcea	A circle extending 20 km	
Tulcea/Cataloi	A circle extending 20 km	
C. Aerodromes for Utility and Sport Aviation		
Bacau/Gheraiesti	A circle extending 5 km (contained within the zone of the Bacau/Bacau Airport)	200
Brasov/Ghimbav	A circle extending 5 km	200
Brasov/Sinpetru	An irregular area limited by Brasov-Risnov-Predeal-Teliu-Feldioara-Brasov	1,300
Bucharest/Clinceni	An irregular area limited by: Domnesti de Jos-Jilava-Calugareni-Ghimpati-Clejani-Domnesti de Jos	2,000
Calarasi/Calarasi	A circle extending 5 km	200
Cluj-Napoca/Dezmir	A circle extending 5 km (contained within the zone of the Cluj-Napoca/Someseni Airport)	300
Craiova/Balta Verde	A circle extending 5 km (contained within the zone of the Craiova/Craiova Airport)	200
Constanta/Tuzla	A circle extending 5 km	200

1	2	3
Deva/Saulesti	A circle extending 5 km	200
Galati/Tulucesti	A circle extending 5 km	200
Iasi/Iasi-South	A circle extending 5 km (contained within the zone of the Iasi/Iasi Airport)	200
Pitesti/Geamana	A circle extending 5 km	200
Ploiesti/Strejnic	A circle extending 7 km	1,000
Suceava/Scheia	A circle extending 5 km (contained within the zone of the Suceava/Salcea Airport)	200
Timisoara/Cioca	A circle extending 5 km (contained within the zone of the Timisoara/Ghiarmata Airport)	200
Tirgu Mures/Muresani	A circle extending 5 km (contained within the zone of the Tirgu Mures/Vidrasau Airport)	200

8724
CSO: 2700

EXTRAVAGANCE CITED IN RELIGIOUS BUILDING IN BOSNIA

Building Limits Proposed

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Oct 80 p 4

[Excerpt] The coordinating council of the Republic Conference of the SAWP of Bosnia-Hercegovina, considering the problem of construction by religious communities, said today in Sarajevo that in the past few years a considerable number of religious facilities had been built in this republic which confirms the fact that the democratization of our society is felt also in this regard. But a reminder was given at the meeting that excesses had arisen in the building of such facilities, for example, the demonstration of power, unnecessary luxury, and the creation of grandiose facilities which do not correspond to actual needs, to the developed status of the opstina, or even the standard of living of the believers. It often happens that legal standards are violated, especially in constructing these facilities without permits. Also, despite precise legal regulations and political views about this problem, various problems arise in practice, such as the illegal action of religious communities, the self-will of individual clericalists, and sectarian behavior.

In Bosnia-Hercegovina at present more than 220 such facilities would be or are in the process of being built. It was said at the meeting that problems are arising in getting building permits, i.e., [there is] "administrative silence" in certain opstinas, or to put it better, there is a lack of understanding among individuals [who believe] that building these projects means the expansion of society toward religious communities.

It was proposed at the meeting that in future the construction of religious facilities should be resolved more simply, for example, urban regulations should establish the space and size of such a facility, so that unrealistic demands will not arise in this regard.

The council examined also some manifestations of politicalization in the publishing and informational activity of religious communities, stating that there are also problems here and an increasing number of texts with politicized content, ranging from hidden allusions to openly clericalist attitudes.

Collections for Construction

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Oct 80 p 6

[Excerpts] ...Such intensity in the construction of religious buildings is followed, often unfortunately, by clericalist or sectarian behavior, illegal actions and talk, among other things, about the unhindered expression of religious freedom. In Bosnia-Hercegovina this is also the result of the fact that there are three traditional religious communities, each of which wants to build religious facilities for their members and do not want to lag behind the other religions.

The frequent building of churches and mosques is, of course, an expression also of the large material possibilities of citizens who are believers. Their contributions to religious communities, the raising and furnishing of these facilities, is their private affair. No one can or should put pressure on them in any way or form. We are not pointing to this...without reason. Certain behavior at the time of building and especially of dedicating the new structure reminds one of a kind of misuse of the increased material possibilities of believers and a kind of pressure on their possibilities and interests.

In the solicitations that are often carried out among believers the costs of construction [reconstruction, etc.] often reach several million [dinars].

Such solicitation was recently discussed in the SAWP and it was concluded that agreements regarding such building should be reached in accord with religious needs and the material possibility of citizens, not only because it [such construction] means another "imposition on the village...," which should be considered in these stabilization times, but also because any soliciting among citizens can violate and threaten their human and moral dignity, which can separate and unjustifiably divide them into first- or second-class citizens, into more devout or less devout, even into greater or lesser members of the faith.

CSO: 2800

NAMING OF PARTIES AT FAULT FOR DETERGENT SHORTAGE URGED

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1546, 17 Aug 80 p 25

[Article by Jug Grizelj: "Lessons of an Incident"]

[Text] The "detergent incident" seems to be fading. And what it teaches us is certainly that it is very easy to cause confusion, but very difficult to correct it. He (or they) who a year ago was unable to examine all the consequences of the actions which brought about the shortage on the market of this obviously indispensable article showed at the very least an incompetence which bordered on negligence.

It turned out, that is, that the consequences of the shortage of this article were vastly out of proportion to the causes of the disturbance, as we have clearly heard (much later, of course, and altogether too late) even from many official spokesmen and places.

During its entire duration the "detergent incident" was characterized by a kind of duel, to be sure often half-unspoken and conducted nervously on both sides, which took place, to oversimplify the thing, between the administration and the public. Aside from keeping the public in a state of uncertainty (especially in the first phase) as to the first causes of the shortage of detergents, it is significant that the competent institutions on several occasions stubbornly insisted in moments of crisis on the argument that supply was "by and large" becoming normal, as was to be seen, it was said and is said even today, from the large amounts of detergents which the factories are distributing to the distribution sector which, however, is unable to satisfy the market, since "individuals are unnecessarily piling up reserves" and are thereby impeding normalization of the supply of this article.

The response of the public to these charges was to ignore them and to stubbornly persist in their siege of the stores.

There is no doubt that the statistical indicators were accurate and that the market did at one point actually obtain more than last year. Yet this

means nothing: the market, i.e., individuals, having been tricked and burned by bad experience, which has now taken it to the point of losing faith, is now demonstrating that lack of faith by hoarding up reserves, as natural a human reaction as there is.

In such a situation "normal amounts of detergents," of course, do not satisfy the market. But this is not the reason why the detergent market is still unsettled, but the consequence. It is the consequence of what we have called incompetence and negligence, and that is an altogether inappropriate name for officials in an administration which are by no means nameless, officials who proposed and conducted the policy of economy and stabilization and carried it out in this unselective way.

Detergents are slowly coming back, and in any case it seems that this problem is solved. What has not been solved--though the question of responsibility and indeed personal responsibility for every action is worked over every day by every spokesman, is the question of the ephemeral history of the still more ephemeral "detergent incident," whose consequences, however, are far from being ephemeral, as has also recently been said from several of the most prestigious political rostrums and forums.

If we wish to speak about the "detergent incident" from the standpoint of our so-called reputation in the world (which in any case, I believe, is a rather artificial category, since no country lives on the reputation which it has outside its own borders unless that reputation is based on its reputation at home), it would then be worth saying that there is something really comic in the failure of millions of foreign tourists on the Adriatic in the recent past to understand how there could be a shortage of detergents and coffee in a country where they have been well and hospitably received, where they can obtain nearly everything they need for a pleasant vacation, just as in their own advanced countries, and those things they can obtain are indeed more expensive and more difficult and complicated to produce or to import than detergents and coffee.

They simply do not understand. They do not understand that an advanced country like ours can have a shortage of detergent, and by and large they explain this by our "sense of the exotic." The foreigners, of course, are wrong, we are well aware of that, this is not a matter of a taste for the exotic, but of negligence and incompetence on the part of a person or persons who have a first name and a last name. Why don't we say so.

The least important reason for this is for the heads to roll, though here and there a public resignation in this or a similar case would certainly signify more than we suppose. But above all so that the administrative official, at least in this sector, would be on a par with a self-manager in an organization of associated labor who is quite well aware that he must bear public responsibility for any oversight both before his own organization of associated labor and before society as a whole.

As far as I can remember, there has never been a case when a journalist refrained for reasons of any political or any other sensitivity from publishing the actual names of the specific individual responsible in a work organization for a specific loss that occurred. On the contrary: when a newsman is prevented from attending some meeting of a work collective where someone's specific responsibility and guilt is being debated--we appeal to all the well-known principles of public scrutiny of proceedings in our self-managed society.

If all of us, and concerning this "detergent incident" I am referring both to the broad base of self-management and to the highest and most responsible delegate forums, to the assemblies and political organizations--took note that the "detergent incident" occurred because of someone's incompetence and irresponsibility, then who are we helping when we do not allow the public to be present when we sit in judgment on those responsible?

What purpose is there in it except that it nurtures an unfortunate and long obsolete assumption of the past--that there is a double standard for responsibility: one used for responsibility of a public figure and another for the responsibility of one who is not a public figure.

If this case, which we have provisionally referred to as the "detergent incident," is not an occasion for rumors to develop about a double standard concerning responsibility, then it would really be difficult to say what sort of occasion that might be.

7045
CSO: 2800

BRIEFS

SOVIET OFFICIAL'S MEMOIRS--The 26 September 1980 issue of the party weekly Belgrade KOMUNIST in Serbo-Croatian p 4 publishes a criticism of Soviet Marshal Aleksander Vasilevski's World War II memoirs which came out in the USSR in 1973 and have now been published in Belgrade. It was pointed in asking why they are being published in Yugoslavia, especially without an introductory comment. Readers, it says, should be made aware of the fact that the author glorifies the Stalinist era in a blatantly propagandistic way, justifying Stalin's pact with Hitler and ignoring historical events, such as the army purges, the Yugoslav and Balkan actions, and the Yalta Conference. [Editorial Report]

CHURCH ROLE IN POLISH CRISIS--The 28 September 1980 issue of the Zagreb Catholic bimonthly GLAS KONCILA in Serbo-Croatian pp 3,7,12, publishes a full-page article on "the Catholic Church in the latest events in Poland," featuring a prominent picture of Lech Walesa and workers praying with a priest and citing Walesa's statement, "Without religion I would be nothing." It also cites from Cardinal Wyszynski's 2 September letter in which he said that the causes of the crisis "are not only economic, but the roots are much deeper. The Cardinal believes that these [causes] are rooted in the monopoly of the party in economic life, the fact that workers are deprived of freedom of opinion and the defense of their rights.... The government is concerned only about increasing production, not considering the physical and phychic possibilities of the workers, their family and religious obligations. ...The workers know where one should seek help to revitalize our society. In another item, GLAS KONCILA also makes reference to the first radio broadcasts in Poland of religious services. This issue also includes a half-page reportage, with picture, on the sentencing of the Russian Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin. [Editorial Report]

SENTENCED FOR ETHNIC INTOLERANCE--On 23 September 1980 Ago Curovac (born in 1929), watchmaker, and Muharem Hasanbegovic (born in 1946), a member of the religious clergy from Gorazde, were each sentenced to 4 years in prison for the criminal act of inciting to national, racist and religious hatred, division, or intolerance (Article 134, Paragraph 1 of the SFRY Criminal Code). The sentence was pronounced by the criminal council of the district court in Sarajevo presided over by Judge Rizah Hadzic. [Text] [Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 24 Sep 80 p 28]

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